Is Islam Capitalist or Socialist?

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By Shahul Hameed


Islam is neither capitalism (Right) nor socialism (Left). It is the comprehensive way of life decreed for mankind by Allah Almighty. In Islam we find principles and formulations aimed at shaping the individual as well as the collective life of man within the parameters of divine guidance contained in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. As Islam encompasses all areas of human life, both politics and economics come under its purview.

The two socio-economic systems predominant in today’s world are democratic capitalism and democratic socialism. The hallmarks of the former are private ownership and free markets, while those of the latter are collective ownership and state control. The United States and France are two countries that have adopted the democratic capitalist system, while China and India, for instance, have adopted democratic socialism.

We find that both these systems suffer from inherent and systemic flaws that have made their practitioners leave their ideals and hastily adopt measures that undermine the very foundation of those systems. Thus, France often calls itself a socialist country, while China already shines with a capitalist hue.

There is also the Communist system, which is described as the culmination of the socialist evolution. But it has never materialized in history and exists only in the dissertations of staunch ideologues. Communism is impracticable, as it seeks to violate human nature and basic instincts.

In contrast with the above systems, the Islamic system approves of individual ownership in the case of certain things and collective ownership in certain other things. Islam also provides for the state ownership of some resources.

Although the true Islamic political system does not exist now, (of course, there are some countries that call themselves, “Islamic”) it once flourished, producing dramatic results. It was Islam in its pristine purity that succeeded in transforming a primitive desert people into the most civilized nation of the time. The boundaries of the Islamic Empire then stretched between China in the East and the Atlantic Ocean in the West. It was the deviation from Islam that caused the failure of the Islamic Empire.

Islam stands for the submission and subordination of all our interests and concerns to the One God; and the foundation of the Islamic state is the principle of the oneness of God. All humans, being the creations of the One God, are equal. Islam views man as a part of nature, which is destined to obey certain rules. The so-called natural laws are the laws of God; and as nature obeys God’s physical laws, nature is Muslim (that is, submitting peacefully to God’s laws). All the planets that float around the sun obey the unalterable laws of God, and so they are Muslim (submitting peacefully to God). Man is distinguished from other creatures of God by virtue of his reasoning power and free will. Man obeys two kinds of laws.

The first kind covers the physical, biological, and instinctive activities like breathing, digesting, or feeling curious. The second kind covers those activities that are based on man’s free choice and decision.
God commands us to live in harmony with the natural laws; when we obey God’s laws of nature, we are Muslim in the basic sense; but when we obey God in areas where we can make moral choices, we are Muslim by willful choice. Man is God’s vicegerent on earth, as Allah says in the Qur’an what means:

*{And when your Lord said to the angels, I am going to place in the earth a vicegerent, they said: What! will You place in it such as shall make mischief in it and shed blood, and we celebrate Your praise and extol Your holiness? He said: Surely I know what you do not know.}* (Al-Baqarah 2:30)

So, the Muslims (who know their God-given role on earth) must strive to fulfill their khilafah (vicegerency) on earth. A moment’s reflection will convince us that the role of khilafah involves both individual and collective efforts. The Islamic state is the chief medium of the collective efforts of Muslims in this regard. It is from this concept that the politics of Islam derives.

One major thrust of the Islamic system is its effort to attain social justice. This should be obvious to anyone who has a cursory knowledge of the Qur’an. For example, the Qur’an says what means:

*{O you who believe! be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness of Allah’s sake, though it may be against your own selves or [your] parents or near relatives; if he be rich or poor, Allah is nearer to them both in compassion; therefore do not follow [your] low desires, lest you deviate; and if you swerve or turn aside, then surely Allah is aware of what you do.}* (An-Nisaa’ 4:135)

It also says what means:

*{O you who believe! Be upright for Allah, bearers of witness with justice, and let not hatred of a people incite you not to act equitably; act equitably, that is nearer to piety, and he careful of [your duty to] Allah; surely Allah is Aware of what you do.}* (Al-Ma’idah 5:8)

So the Islamic state would strive for social justice by all the means at its disposal; and naturally to lessen the material differences among the people has top priority for it. Capitalism, on the contrary, favors the rich and approves and contributes to widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots in the society; and this is one major difference between the two systems.

Islam recognizes the differences among people owing to their natural inborn talent, education, capacity for work, and so on, and makes allowances for these. But socialism would ignore these differences among people and impose its “concept of equality” on the society. That is why the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (the radical Communists who controlled Cambodia for four nightmarish years from 1975 to 1979), for instance, compelled engineers and doctors to work in the farms, with disastrous consequences. But the Islamic state recognizes these differences and gives freedom to people by providing equal opportunities for all members of the society to develop and utilize their talents and tastes as best as they can.

The chief cause of economic problems, according to the capitalists, is the scarcity of natural resources; whereas according to the socialists, it is the exploitation of the workers by the capitalists. Islam differs from both as it realizes that the reason for the economic problems is man himself. The Qur’an says what means:

*{And He has made subservient to you the sun and the moon pursuing their courses, and He has made subservient to you the night and the day. And He gives you of all that you ask Him; and if you count Allah’s favors, you will not be able to number them; most surely Man is very unjust, very ungrateful.}* (Ibrahim 14:33-34)

This means that unjust and ungrateful man disregards God’s laws that provide the principles of equality and social justice; thereby he creates discord between groups and wastes the resources and scatters destruction. Thus, from the Islamic point of view, it is man himself who is the root of all problems; so if man is taught to check his pride, his meanness and his greed, there will be peace on earth, as well as progress and prosperity.

For the above reason, the first endeavor of Islam is to develop in its adherents a commitment to honor God’s laws in nature, in individual life as well as in social life. In brief, the political or economic system of Islam is an inseparable part of a complete code for the whole of human life. Therefore, it is pointless to isolate one area of human endeavor from the total Islamic system to analyze it. In other words, the economics or politics of Islam is of a piece with its morality and spirituality, which are reflected in Muslim life. The advantage Islam has over man-made systems is that Islam binds man to God. As someone has explained, Islam starts from the depths of the human conscience and proceeds in its endeavor to secure a happy life for all.


http://www.onislam.net/english/ask-about-islam/islam-and-the-world/politics-and-economics/166290-is-islam-capitalist-or-socialist.html?

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The unfortunate conditions obtaining in the Muslim world today have misguided some to regard the Islamic economic system as a form of "Capitalism." Nothing can be farther from truth. Exactly speaking, Islam is a class by itself. But if it can be likened to any of the modern ideologies, that is Socialism. A brief analysis of the economic teachings of Islam in the light of this fact may, therefore, be given, in order to bring into broad relief the role which Islam can play in defeating the challenge of Communism.

(1) Islam is not "Capitalism" because, although it allows private property and gives the scope for personal initiative, it is definitely opposed to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. Islam achieves that end by different means, the most important among which are:—

(a) Islam stands for the state-ownership of such "means of production" as the mineral wealth, thus eliminating from its society the steel-barons and the oil-magnates.

(b) Islam prohibits usury and interest in all forms. All students of economics know that the greatest impetus which Capitalism receives today is from the modern system of Banking which functions on the basis of interest. Islam does not permit the rate of interest to rise above zero and conceives the Bank primarily as the medium of commercial transactions.

(c) In the field of Agriculture, Islam does not favour feudal absentee landlordism. Its ideal is the creation of a society of peasant-proprietors.

(d) Among all the systems of Law, the Islamic law of inheritance is the most anti-capitalistic. It stands for the distribution of inherited wealth among the largest number of persons on the basis of the widest margin of relationship.

(e) Islam condemns the hoarding of capital in very strong terms. It imposes a fairly heavy tax on all capital, above a certain minimum standard, for the benefit of the less fortunates.

(2) The Islamic economic system is "socialistic" because:—

(a) From the ultimate point of view, Islam regards the interest of the society above the interest of the individual.

(b) Islam makes it an obligation of the Islamic state to provide for the basic necessities of life, including such 'modem necessities' as health services and free education, for all of its citizens. With that end in view Islam levies a Social Insurance Tax on all persons possessing more than a certain minimum of wealth.

(c) Islam stands for free trade. It is averse to monopolies and favours the participation of the largest number of people in commerce, for which it advocates the creation of Mutual Alliance Societies—Islam's substitute for Capitalistic Banking.

(d) In the field of industry, Islam's ideal is the creation of the "Co-operative Guilds of Workers" where all forms of exploitation as well as unrest and bad blood are eliminated.

(e) Islam, however, does allow private enterprise in industry even as it allows private trade. But then it propounds a socialistic principle of wages. In that connection: (i) It gives freedom to the wage-earner to fix his wages at whatever reasonable level he desires. Simultaneously with this prerogative it safeguards the wage-earner against all possible harm which the 'capitalist' might do to him by closing the doors of livelihood, and for that purpose it creates a fund for the maintenance by the state of all unemployed wage-earners; (ii) The standard of wages which Islam has ordered all the Muslim employers to adhere to is that in which the employee gets the "same to eat" which the employer eats and the "same to wear" which the employer wears. That means equalisation of economic status between the employer and the employee in the basic necessities of life.

(f) Islam does not only demarcate clearly the legitimate (socially good) and the illegitimate (socially evil) means and methods of income but it also limits the legitimate items of expenditure in such a way that in a. truly Islamic society it must become (and it did become in actual fact in the glorious period of Muslim history) impossible to find glaring inequalities in the basic manifestations of economic life. It is in the field of luxuries that most of the social heart-burning is to be found, and Islam sets healthy limits to them. For instance, household articles made of gold and silver have always formed an integral part of aristocratic life. Islam prohibits them definitely. Similarly, Islam prohibits the use of certain types of aristocratic clothes by men. Islam has permitted the Muslims to spend only on such things which have some real utility for the development of human life and it lays down the comprehensive principle that all spare money which one has, after spending on the basic and healthy necessities of life, is a trust of God meant for the improvement of the social health.

(g) As all students of Islam know, Islam establishes "spiritual democracy," "social democracy" and "political democracy" of the most perfect type. The teachings of Islam relating to these three aspects of human life, combined with its economic teachings, if followed in letter and spirit, guarantee the establishment of a classless society where all social conflicts must remain in abeyance.


http://ourpurposeoflife.blogspot.co.nz/2011/06/islam-capitalism-and-socialism.html

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Fatwa : Islamic Jurisprudence and Legal Maxims

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By MUGHEES SHAUKAT
22/04/2009

INCEIF the Global University in Islamic Finance
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
MIF/PhD Program

General Perception of Fatwa and its role in Islamic Finance
(See paper for abstract and Introduction)

The first legal rulings were issued by the Prophet in his role as intermediary between God and the Muslims. Fatwa is one of the noble tasks of Prophethood that has been known throughout the history of mankind. Due to the critical position of fatwa competent scholars fear from it and prefer not to get involved in its process due to the implications on human life.

1. Meaning of fatwa

A fatwa (plural fataawaa), in the Islamic faith is a religious opinion on Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar. In Sunni Islam any fatwa is non-binding, whereas in Shia Islam it could be, depending on the status of the scholar.

Fatwa is derived from the root fata, which includes in its semantic field the meanings “youth, newness, clarification, explanation.” In the Qur'an, the term is used in two verbal forms meaning “asking for a definitive answer,” and “giving a definitive answer” (4.127, 176), although neither passage has a binding clause. Consequently, the concept of fatwa in early Islam developed in the framework of a question-and-answer process to better communicate on religious matters. Its subject was 'ilm (knowledge) without further specification. Later, when ?ilm was identified with Hadith (sayings of the Prophet , which are divided into two parts, the matn (text) and the isnad (chain of reporters to verify authenticity), Fatwa came to be associated with ra'y (opinion) and fiqh (jurisprudence). After a corpus of legal definitions emerged, the term followed madrasah (religious school) interpretations, especially when fiqh did not provide clear technical assessments.

In the early days of Islam, fatwa were pronounced by distinguished scholars to provide guidance to other scholars, judges and citizens on how subtle points of Islamic law should be understood, interpreted or applied. There were strict rules on who is eligible to issue a valid fatwa and who could not, as well as on the conditions the fatwa must satisfy to be valid.

2.1 History of fatwa in Islam.

The first legal rulings were issued by the Prophet in his role as intermediary between God and the Muslims. The form in which these legal commands were revealed takes into account the fact that the Islamic model instituted by the Prophet reflected, in some respects, a drastic departure from previous Arab customs while in other areas, the Islamic response built upon existing customary practices. Because of this relationship between pre-Islamic customs and the new Islamic legal structure, many Qur'anic legal commands were revealed as a result of individual members of the Prophet's (s.a.w.) community approaching him for "clarification regarding the continuing validity of a certain practice."

After the Prophet's death, when direct access to divine revelation was no longer available, Muslims turned to the Prophet's closest Companions for guidance. Fatawa at this point in Islamic history took the form of the Companions commenting on how the Prophet approached a certain issue. When the generation of the Companions died out, Muslims came to rely on hadith, which were linked to the Prophet through their isnad. Those who mastered these hadith, the 'ulama, became in the second Islamic century the means by which to receive religious guidance on specific issues. As the Islamic Empire expanded and sophisticated state control became increasingly necessary, legal scholarship as the basis of state legitimacy-took on a similarly bureaucratic nature. Whereas "fatwa began as a private activity that was independent of state control," it became increasingly formalized, culminating in the creation of the four Sunni madhhabs and Shi'i Jafari madhhab, each of which compiled its own "fatwa collections."

Today, with the existence of modern independent States, each with its own legislative system, and/or its own body of Ulemas, each country develops and applies its own rules, based on its own interpretation of religious prescriptions. Many Muslim countries (such as Egypt and Tunisia) have an official Mufti position; a distinguished expert in the Shariah is appointed to this position by the civil authorities of the country.

2.2 Fatwa of Sahaba (companion of the Prophet)

Fatwa (opinion or ruling) of Sahaba is indeed a very important and deserves highest consideration, they being close to the Prophet and because of their direct knowledge from the Prophet. There is some disagreement as to who is a Sahabi. Majority hold that anybody who met the Prophet while believing Islam is a Sahabi. Minority hold that "Suhbat" (continuity of companionship) is a requirement to call a person a Sahabi of the Prophet [Imam Shawkani, Irshad; also Dr. Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, U.K.]. Both points of view have justifications and cannot be ignored. The fact of being Sahabi can be established by continuous testimony (tawatur) or by affirmation of any other companion or even by own claim (if the person is upright).

Fatwa of Sahaba means an opinion reached by a Sahaba by way of Ijtihad. As regards whether fatwa of Sahaba constitute a proof on succeeding generations, there are three views: First view is that - it is an absolute proof. The proponents of this view quote the Quranic verses 9:100, 3:109. They also quote Hadith like "my companions are like stars" or “Honour my companions". First view is held by Imam Malik, Imam Shafii and Ahmad Bin Hanbal also have been quoted in its support. Against this view, it has been suggested that these references speak of the status and dignity of Sahaba. These are not categorical (Qaati) regarding compulsion to obey their decisions).

Second view is - that Ijtihad of a companion is not a proof and does not bind the succeeding generations. Hanafi jurist Abul Hasan al Karkhi, Imam Ahmed (according to one view of him) and Asharite and Mutazilite scholars hold this view. They quote the Quranic Ayat 59 : 2 ("Consider, O You who have vision"). It is argued that the Ayat makes Ijtihad an obligation of all who are competent and makes no distinction between Sahabis and others. Imam Gazali and Amidi consider it preferred view.

Third view is that of Abu Hanifa himself. He says that ruling of a companion is a proof if it is in conflict with Qiyas but not when it agrees with Qiyas. The aforesaid are the main views. There are some other views which may be seen in the books of Usul. It can be concluded that the Fatwa of a companion is a source of guidance which merits careful consideration (though not binding except in case of their clear Ijma).

2.3 Contemporary Trends

There have been significant recent developments as to the muftī's character, the medium through which fatawa are communicated, the types of questions posed, and the methodologies by which the muftīs arrive at their answers. According to the traditional principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh), a muftī must acquire a high level of specialized knowledge before issuing fatawa; however, many militant and reform movements have disseminated fatawa issued by non-specialists which have been widely circulated and followed. For example, in 1998 Usāma bin Lāden, together with four other associates calling themselves the World Islamic Front, issued a fatwa calling for a “Jihād against Jews and Crusaders.” The fatwa proclaimed it the individual duty of all Muslims to kill as many Americans as possible, including civilians. In addition to denouncing the content of this and other fatawa attributed to bin Lāden, many Muslim jurists have stressed bin Lāden's lack of the requisite qualifications for either issuing fatawa or declaring jihād.

In July 2005, nearly two hundred prominent ῾ulamā' convened in Jordan to issue a ruling that recognized the legitimacy of eight schools of Islamic law, forbade declaring any member of these schools to be an apostate, and declared that only scholars trained according to the requirements of a recognized school of law may issue fatawa. Known as the “Amman Message,” a major purpose of the statement was to delegitimize the fatawa promulgated by leaders of violent Islamist movements.

A fatwa issued in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States also illustrates several recent trends in iftā'. A few days after the attacks, a Muslim chaplain in the U.S. Army asked a group of 'ulamā' about the permissibility of participating in a war against Muslim countries. In response, five Middle Eastern scholars issued a joint fatwa permitting Muslim military personnel in the U.S. armed forces to participate in actions against Muslim states. Rather than referencing any of the major schools of Islamic law, the authors of this fatwa drew support for their position directly from the Qur'ān and Hadith. The collective fatwa, the lack of adherence to any one school of law, and the incidence of questions from Western Muslims directed toward muftīs in Muslim countries have all become common features of iftā'.

An estimated one‐third of the world's Muslims now live in majority non‐Muslim countries. The demand for fatawa on such issues as attending church weddings, responding to a French ban on headscarves in public schools, or buying houses through mortgages, has led to the controversial development of what since 1994 has been termed fiqh al‐aqallīyāt, or the jurisprudence of Muslim minorities. Organizations such as the Fiqh Council of North America, established in 1986, and the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR, http://www.e-cfr.org/ar/), founded in 1997, have sought to provide authoritative rulings that address the concerns of minority Muslims, facilitate their adherence to Islamic law, and stress the compatibility of Islam with life in diverse modern contexts.

The ECFR's international membership has adopted an explicit methodology of drawing on all four major schools of law, as well as a range of other legal concepts, in order to produce collective fatawa suitable for European contexts. For example, an ECFR ruling issued in 2001 allowed a female convert to Islam to remain married to her non‐Muslim husband; the muftīs justified this stance partly on the basis of existing European laws and customs which guarantee women the freedom of religion. Although this type of ruling has been welcomed by many, it has been criticized by others as a divisive system of exceptions.

Far less formal than the deliberations of the ECFR; are the fatawa, issued online by “cyber-muftis.” Web sites such as Islam‐Online (www.islamonline.net/) and Fatwa‐Online (www.fatwaonline.com/) are among a large number of sites offering instant fatawa to readers from all over the world. Islam-Online publishes a searchable archive of ‘live fatwa’ sessions, which numbered almost a thousand in mid‐2007, and posts each muftī's biography. These sites, along with radio shows and satellite television programs offering call‐in fatawa, have contributed to the changing, and thriving, nature of contemporary iftā'. Muslims may now consult any number of muftīs worldwide, anonymously, instantly, and from the comfort of their home or local Internet café.

2.4 Scope of Fatwa

Fatwa covers a wider scope, including matters of legal theory, theology, philosophy, and creeds, which are not included in fiqh studies. Thus, the concept retains a broader concern about religion and society than is reflected in the formal Islamic law defined by the five schools. From the perspective of judicial authority, realm, and enforceability, fatwa is contrasted with qadā, or court judgment. The jurisdiction of fatwa is wider than qaḍā; matters such as 'ibadat (religious duties or obligations) are excluded from the power of courts, even though they are essential parts of Islamic law and appear very prominently in fiqh manuscripts and fatawa. The major difference between the two is in their enforceability: qadā is binding and enforceable whereas fatwa is voluntary. The concept of fatwa can therefore be seen as an indirect instrument for defining formal concepts of law when applied in courts. From the perspective of moral and religious obligation, fatwa is contrasted with taqwā or piety. For instance, a fatwa may allow choice between a lenient (rukhsah) and a severe ('azimah) view about the permissibility of a certain matter, or it may resort to legal devices (hilah) to circumvent the strict implications of a law, but taqwā may not approve of such strategies. This last contrast is often referred to in literary and Sūfī writings.

2.5. Characteristics of fatwa in Islamic

Imam Ahmad (may Allah be pleased with him) said that the one nominated to hold the position of Mufti, should possess the following characteristics:

o He should have a pure intention to guide the questioner and never to misguide him.
o He should have deep insight, equanimity and tranquility.
o He should have a firm religious background and deep knowledge.
o In his capacity as a religious leader, the Mufti should have adequate means to earn hislivelihood.
o Finally, he should be aware of daily life and contemporary issues.”

Moreover, Sheikh M. S. Al-Munajjid, a prominent Saudi Muslim lecturer and author, adds “Not every individual has the right to issue Fatawa and make pronouncements on matters. A Mufti must be qualified and of profound knowledge. He has to be able to know the evidence, the wording and apparent meaning of the texts, what is Sahih (authentic) and what is Da`if (weak), An-Nasikh wal-Mansukh (the abrogating and the abrogated), what is specific in application and what is general, and what is stated in brief and what is mentioned in detail.

This needs lengthy experience and practice, knowledge of the various branches of Fiqh and where to look for information, knowledge of the opinions of the scholars and jurists, and memorization or knowledge of the religious texts. The Mufti should be knowledgeable and rich in life experience. We cannot imagine him to live in an ivory tower and turn a blind eye to life around him. Undoubtedly, issuing Fatawa without having qualification to do so is a grave sin. Allah has warned us against that, saying: "And speak not, concerning that which your own tongues qualify (as clean or unclean), the falsehood: "This is lawful, and this is forbidden,’ so that ye invent a lie against Allah. Lo! Those who invent a lie against Allah will not succeed.” (An-Nahl: 116)”

According to the usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), the fatwa must meet the following conditions in order to be valid:

o The fatwa is in line with relevant legal proofs, deduced from Qur'anic verses and hadiths; provided the ahadith was not later abrogated by Muhammad.
o It is issued by a person (or a board) having due knowledge and sincerity of heart;
o It is free from individual opportunism, and not depending on political servitude;
o It is adequate with the needs of the contemporary world.

2.6 Legal implications of a fatwa

There is a binding rule that saves the fatwa pronouncements from creating judicial havoc, whether within a Muslim country or at the level of the Islamic world in general: it is unanimously agreed that a fatwa is only binding on its author.

Fatwa functioned independently of the judicial system, although in some systems muftīs who issued decrees would be officially seconded to religious courts. Thus, in Andalusian benches muftīs sat as mushawar (jurisconsults), and in early British Indian magistrates they sat as mawlawis (men of learning). Jurists compiled volumes of fatawa stating, for the benefit of judges, the consensual and authoritative views and doctrines of a particular school. Partly for these reasons, the position of muftīs in Muslim political systems was defined by the role fiqh enacted in that society. In Andalusia, jurists were indeed powerful, because they were part of the shūrā (council) of amīrs and caliphs, whereas in the Ottoman and Mughal political systems, the chief muftī was designated as Shaykh al- Islam. Muftīs were also appointed to various other positions, including market inspectors, guardians of public morals, and advisors to governments on religious affairs.

Under colonial rule the madrasahs took over the role of muftīs as religious guides. The madrasahs established the institution of dar al-ifta, a place to issue fatawa. The print and electronic media in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries reinforced the role and impact of fatawa. Muftīs were faced with day-to-day challenges in economic, political, scientific, and technological fields. Not only did the scope of fatwa widen, but because of its instant availability to a wider public, its language, presentation, and style adapted. Although no international Islamic authority has been established to settle legal differences, an Islamic Fiqh Academy was created in January 1981 by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), but its renditions are not binding.

This was underlined by Sheikh Abdul Mohsen Al-Obeikan, vice-minister of Justice of Saudi Arabia, in an interview with the Arabic daily "Asharq al awsat", as recently as on July 9, 2006, in a discussion of the legal value of a fatwā by the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA) on the subject of misyar marriage, which had been rendered by IFA on April 12, 2006 .

Despite this, sometimes, even leading religious authorities and theologians misleadingly present their fatwa as obligatory, or try to adopt some "in-between" position.

Thus, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar in Cairo, Muhammad Sayid Tantawy, who is the leading religious authority in the Sunni Muslim establishment in Egypt, alongside the Mufti of Egypt, said the following about fatawa issued by himself or the entire Dar al-Ifta:

"Fatwa issued by Al-Azhar are not binding, but they are not just whistling in the wind either; individuals are free to accept them, but Islam recognizes that extenuating circumstances may prevent it. For example, it is the right of Muslims in France who object to the law banning the veil to bring it up to the legislative and judicial authorities. If the judiciary decides in favor of the government because the country is secular, they would be considered to be Muslim individuals acting under compelling circumstances." Otherwise, in his view, they would be expected to adhere to the fatwa.

In Morocco, where king Mohammed VI is also Amir al-Muminin (Commander of the faithful), the authorities have tried to organize the field by creating a scholars' council (conseil des oulémas) composed of Muslim scholars (ulema) which is the only one allowed to issue fatwa.

In this case, a national theocracy could in fact compel intra-national compliance with the fatwa, since a central authority is the source. Muslims in other nations would obviously not be required to obey it.

3. Islamic Schools of law their Methodology of fatwa and its development:

There are a few methods of fatwa applied by scholars from different school of law, depending on various approaches in Islamic jurisprudence. We elaborate very briefly on those methods according to the popular school of law:

3.1. Maliki School of law:

Imam Malik was known as the “master” of the Hadith School and therefore the influence of hadith in his ijtihad is very clear, and his fatwa is tradition or hadith based. Before Imam Malik gets involved in the issuance of fatwa, he usually considers and observes few criteria in his fatwa as follows:

o ‘Farness from fatwa’, he used to say I don’t know in most of the cases subject to his ijtihad.
o Thoughtfulness, slowness, careful consideration, deliberation before fatwa in order to provide an accurate and sound Islamic ruling. This approach demonstrates the value and appreciation given to fatwa.
o Imam Malik dislikes issuing fatwa for something which did not yet happen, i.e. Propositional law. Usually he issues the fatwa only when it happens and becomes a real case which needs an Islamic ruling.

3.1.1. The Maliki School its Methodology and Development of fatwa:

The criteria that have been established by the Master of the school were taken into account by his followers and the leaders of the schools after him. Furthermore they have developed the methodology of the fatwa in the school and established a reliable and sound source and criteria for the fatwa in the mazhab. The major sources of Shariah in ijtihad and fatwa observed by the Maliki School taken into consideration during the issuing of the Islamic ruling are: the Holy Quran, Hadith Sharif (tradition of the Prophet ), ijma. (consensus of legal opinion), amal ahl al madinah (tradition of people of Madina), fatawa of the companion of the prophet , qiyas(analogy), masaleh al-mursalah (public interest), istihsan (juristic preference), sadu darrai (blocking the lawful means to an unlawful end), and al-urf (Custom).

The above sources represent the major and important sources for ijtihad and fatwa in the Maliki School. However there are some characteristics pertaining to each source which must be fulfilled to ensure the sound approach in the interpretation of the text, or in determining the new case subject to fatwa.

3.2. Shafai School of law



3.3. Hanafi School of law:

Abu Hanifa. the master of this school, is one of the prominent scholars recognized by this ummah, but his methodology in fatwa and ijtihad is different from Imam malik due to the normative influence from his intellectual environment in Iraq where the hadith was not the back bone of his ijtihad but he depended on a rational approach and the use of the intellect and reasoning as important sources for interpretation. The major sources in the Hanafi School taken into consideration considered during the issuance of fatwa and Islamic ruling are: the Holy Quran, Hadith Sharif, ijma, and selection from fatawa of the companion of the prophet, qiyas, masaleh al mursalah, al-urf and Istihsan.

3.4. Hanbali School of law

Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal is the master of the Hanbali school of law and the prominent student of Imam Shafi, The Hanbali school took into consideration the following major sources when issuing the Islamic ruling and they are: the Holy Quran, sunnah (hadith sharif), ijma, fatawa of the companion of the Prophet , al ahdith al mursal (broken chain in companion) and qiyas. Besides the abovementioned sources, Imam Ahmad considered other factors in his fatwa as follows:

o The changing of time and location (this factor is considered by other scholars as well).
o He is not restricted to his previous fatawa.
o He takes into account the principle of daroura.
o Observe the niyyah or intention of the person in his fatwa and the Islamic ruling can be affected according to his intention.

3.5. Imam Al Shawqani (as independent scholar)

Imam al-Shawqani is not a master of any school of law but he is an independent jurist and a competent scholar accepted by the ummah. By reviewing his fatawa in finance and other aspects of Shariah we can observe some important criteria which govern his methodology in fatwa and ijtihad as follows:

3.5.1: Methodology of his fatwa:

Shawqani has adopted some criteria in his fatwa methodology which can be summarized in the following points:

o Refer to al dalil (evidence) and dependence on it in issuing fatwa or in supporting any
Shariah opinion.
o Independent in his ijtihad, which means that Imam Shawqani was an independent scholar in his ijtihad and interpreted the text according to his understanding as a qualified and competent scholar.
o Depending on the Arabic language in extracting the fatwa or Islamic ruling from the text,
o Connecting the branches of fiqh to the Islamic jurisprudence rules.
o Linking the investigation in fiqh with the hadith (Sunnah)
o Depending on reasoning as additional evidence to support his understanding and fatwa.Consideration of the social dimension in his fatwa Consideration of maqasid al-Shariah in his fatwa.

3.5.2: Technical approach in his fatwa:

In addition to the above criteria, Shawqani has some other technical methods which support his overall methodology in fatwa which are as follows:

o Providing an introduction to the fatwa by some rules of Islamic jurisprudence related to the subject matter of fatwa.
o Providing the fatwa in details and not in brief statements like other scholars do. The fatwa of Shawqani therefore is detailed and explicit like a research paper rather than a very brief statement.
o Emphasizing more on the hadith in his fatwa, and depending on it as sound proof and evidence in supporting and empowering his Shariah opinion due to his background in hadith. He is in fact considered as one of the distinguished scholars of hadith.

4. Fatwa in Islamic finance
4.1 Importance of fatwa and its roles in Islamic banking and finance
4.2. Methodology of fatwa in Islamic finance:
4.3. Some rules governing the fatwa and the mufti in Islamic finance
5. Fatwa issued by Shariah board or advisory Shariah council.
5.1. The area covered by Shariah advisory
5.2. Duties and responsibility of Shariah committee
Key Terms
References

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World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity

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The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity

POLL August 9, 2012

The world’s 1.6 billion Muslims are united in their belief in God and the Prophet Muhammad and are bound together by such religious practices as fasting during the holy month of Ramadan and almsgiving to assist people in need. But they have widely differing views about many other aspects of their faith, including how important religion is to their lives, who counts as a Muslim and what practices are acceptable in Islam, according to a worldwide survey by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life.

The survey, which involved more than 38,000 face-to-face interviews in over 80 languages, finds that in addition to the widespread conviction that there is only one God and that Muhammad is His Prophet, large percentages of Muslims around the world share other articles of faith, including belief in angels, heaven, hell and fate (or predestination). While there is broad agreement on the core tenets of Islam, however, Muslims across the 39 countries and territories surveyed differ significantly in their levels of religious commitment, openness to multiple interpretations of their faith and acceptance of various sects and movements.

Some of these differences are apparent at a regional level. For example, at least eight-in-ten Muslims in every country surveyed in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and South Asia say that religion is very important in their lives. Across the Middle East and North Africa, roughly six-in-ten or more say the same. And in the United States, a 2011 Pew Research Center survey found that nearly seven-in-ten Muslims (69%) say religion is very important to them. (For more comparisons with U.S. Muslims, see Appendix A.) But religion plays a much less central role for some Muslims, particularly in nations that only recently have emerged from communism. No more than half of those surveyed in Russia, the Balkans and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia say religion is very important in their lives. The one exception across this broad swath of Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Central Asia is Turkey, which never came under communist rule; fully two-thirds of Turkish Muslims (67%) say religion is very important to them.

Generational differences are also apparent. Across the Middle East and North Africa, for example, Muslims 35 and older tend to place greater emphasis on religion and to exhibit higher levels of religious commitment than do Muslims between the ages of 18 and 34. In all seven countries surveyed in the region, older Muslims are more likely to report that they attend mosque, read the Quran (also spelled Koran) on a daily basis and pray multiple times each day. Outside of the Middle East and North Africa, the generational differences are not as sharp. And the survey finds that in one country – Russia – the general pattern is reversed and younger Muslims are significantly more observant than their elders. 

There are also differences in how male and female Muslims practice their faith. In most of the 39 countries surveyed, men are more likely than women to attend mosque. This is especially true in Central Asia and South Asia, where majorities of women in most of the countries surveyed say they never attend mosque. However, this disparity appears to result from cultural norms or local customs that constrain women from attending mosque, rather than from differences in the importance that Muslim women and men place on religion. In most countries surveyed, for example, women are about as likely as men to read (or listen to readings from) the Quran on a daily basis. And there are no consistent differences between men and women when it comes to the frequency of prayer or participation in annual rites, such as alms giving and fasting during Ramadan.

Sectarian Differences 

The survey asked Muslims whether they identify with various branches of Islam and about their attitudes toward other branches or subgroups. While these sectarian differences are important in some countries, the survey suggests that many Muslims around the world either do not know or do not care about them.

Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa tend to be most keenly aware of the distinction between the two main branches of Islam, Sunni and Shia.² (See text box for definitions.) In most countries surveyed in the region, at least 40% of Sunnis do not accept Shias as fellow Muslims. In many cases, even greater percentages do not believe that some practices common among Shias, such as visiting the shrines of saints, are acceptable as part of Islamic tradition. Only in Lebanon and Iraq – nations where sizable populations of Sunnis and Shias live side by side – do large majorities of Sunnis recognize Shias as fellow Muslims and accept their distinctive practices as part of Islam.

Outside of the Middle East and North Africa, the distinction between Sunni and Shia appears to be of lesser consequence. In many of the countries surveyed in Central Asia, for instance, most Muslims do not identify with either branch of Islam, saying instead that they are “just a Muslim.” A similar pattern prevails in Southern and Eastern Europe, where pluralities or majorities in all countries identify as “just a Muslim.” In some of these countries, decades of communist rule may have made sectarian distinctions unfamiliar. But identification as “just a Muslim” is also prevalent in many countries without a communist legacy. For example, in Indonesia, which has the world’s largest Muslim population, 26% of Muslims describe themselves as Sunnis, compared with 56% who say they are “just a Muslim” and 13% who do not give a definite response.

Opinion also varies as to whether Sufis – members of religious orders who emphasize the mystical dimensions of Islam – belong to the Islamic faith.³ In South Asia, Sufis are widely seen as Muslims, while in other regions they tend to be less well known or not widely accepted as part of the Islamic tradition. Views differ, too, with regard to certain practices traditionally associated with particular Sufi orders. For example, reciting poetry or singing in praise of God is generally accepted in most of the countries where the question was asked. But only in Turkey do a majority of Muslims believe that devotional dancing is an acceptable form of worship, likely reflecting the historical prominence of the Mevlevi or “whirling dervish” Sufi order in Turkey.

Differing Views on Orthodoxy 

The survey asked Muslims whether they believe there is only one true way to understand Islam’s teachings or if multiple interpretations are possible. In 32 of the 39 countries surveyed, half or more Muslims say there is only one correct way to understand the teachings of Islam.

This view, however, is far from universal. In the Middle East and North Africa, majorities or substantial minorities in most countries – including Tunisia, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Iraq – believe that it is possible to interpret Islam’s teachings in multiple ways. In sub-Saharan Africa, at least one-in-five Muslims agree. In South Asia, Southeast Asia and across Southern and Eastern Europe, at least one-in-six in every country surveyed believe Islam is open to multiple interpretations.

In some Central Asian countries, slightly fewer Muslims say their faith can be subject to more than one interpretation. But in Kazakhstan (31%), Turkey (22%) and Kyrgyzstan (17%), the percentage that holds this view is on par with countries in other regions.

In the United States, by contrast, 57% of Muslims say Islam is open to multiple interpretations. On this measure, Muslim Americans look similar to Muslims in Morocco and Tunisia. (For more comparisons with previous surveys of U.S. Muslims, see Appendix A.)

What is a Median?  

The median is the middle number in a list of numbers sorted from highest to lowest. On many questions in this report, medians are reported for groups of countries to help readers see regional patterns in religious beliefs and practices.

For a region with an odd number of countries, the median on a particular question is the middle spot among the countries surveyed in that region. For regions with an even number of countries, the median is computed as the average of the two countries at the middle of the list (e.g., where six nations are shown, the median is the average of the third and fourth countries listed in the region).

By contrast, figures reported for individual countries represent the total percentage for the category reported.

Core Beliefs 

Traditionally, Muslims adhere to several articles of faith. Among the most widely known are: there is only one God; God has sent numerous messengers, with Muhammad being His final Prophet; God has revealed Holy Scriptures, including the Quran; God’s angels exist, even if people cannot see them; there will be a Day of Judgment, when God will determine whether individuals are consigned to heaven or hell; and God’s will and knowledge are absolute, meaning that people are subject to fate or predestination.⁴ 

As previously noted, belief in one God and the Prophet Muhammad is nearly universal among Muslims in most countries surveyed. Although the survey asked only respondents in sub-Saharan Africa whether they consider the Quran to be the word of God, the findings in that region indicate broad assent.⁵Across most of the African nations surveyed, more than nine-in-ten Muslims say the Quran is the word of God, and solid majorities say it should be taken literally, word for word. Only in two countries in the region – Guinea Bissau (59%) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (54%) – do smaller percentages think the Quran should be read literally. The results in those two countries are similar to the United States, where 86% of Muslims said in a 2007 survey that the Quran was the word of God, including 50% who said it should be read literally, word for word. (For more U.S. results, see Appendix A.)

The survey asked respondents in all 39 countries whether they believe in the existence of angels. In Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East-North Africa region, belief in angels is nearly universal. In Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa more than seven-in-ten also say angels are real. Even in Southern and Eastern Europe,  a median of 55% share this view.

The expression “Inshallah” (“If God wills”) is a common figure of speech among Muslims and reflects the Islamic tradition that the destiny of individuals, and the world, is in the hands of God. And indeed, the survey finds that the concept of predestination, or fate, is widely accepted among Muslims in most parts of the world. In four of the five regions where the question was asked, medians of about nine-in-ten (88% to 93%) say they believe in fate, while a median of 57% express this view in Southern and Eastern Europe.

The survey also asked about the existence of heaven and hell. Across the six regions included in the study, a median of more than seven-in-ten Muslims say that paradise awaits those who have lived righteous lives, while a median of at least two-thirds say hell is the ultimate fate of those who do not live righteously and do not repent.

Unifying Rituals 

Along with the core beliefs discussed above, Islam is defined by “Five Pillars” – basic rituals that are obligatory for all members of the Islamic community who are physically able to perform them. The Five Pillars include: the profession of faith (shahadah); daily prayer (salat); fasting during the holy month of Ramadan (sawm); annual alms giving to assist the poor or needy (zakat); and participation in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca at least once during one’s lifetime (hajj). Two of these – fasting during Ramadan and alms giving – stand out as communal rituals that are especially widespread among Muslims across the globe.

Fasting during the month of Ramadan, which according to Islamic tradition is required of all healthy, adult Muslims, is part of an annual rite in which individuals place renewed emphasis on the teachings of the Quran. The survey finds that many Muslims in all six major geographical regions surveyed observe the month-long, daytime fast during Ramadan. In Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, medians of more than nine-in-ten say they fast annually (94%-99%). Many Muslims in Southern and Eastern Europe and in Central Asia also report fasting during Ramadan.

Annual alms giving, which by custom is supposed to equal approximately 2.5% of a person’s total wealth, is almost as widely observed as fasting during Ramadan. In Southeast Asia and South Asia, a median of roughly nine-in-ten Muslims (93% and 89%, respectively) say they perform zakat. At least three-quarters of respondents in the countries surveyed in the Middle East and North Africa (79%) and sub-Saharan Africa (77%) also report that they perform zakat. Smaller majorities in Central Asia (69%) and Southern and Eastern Europe (56%) say they practice annual alms giving.

One Faith, Different Levels of Commitment 

These common practices and shared beliefs help to explain why, to many Muslims, the principles of Islam seem both clear and universal. As mentioned above, half or more in most of the 39 countries surveyed agree that there is only one way to interpret the teachings of Islam.

But even though the idea of a single faith is widespread, the survey finds that Muslims differ significantly in their assessments of the importance of religion in their lives, as well as in their views about the forms of worship that should be accepted as part of the Islamic faith.

Central Asia along with Southern and Eastern Europe have relatively low levels of religious commitment, both in terms of the lower importance that Muslims in those regions place on religion and in terms of self-reported religious practices. With the exception of Turkey, where two-thirds of Muslims say religion is very important in their lives, half or fewer across these two regions say religion is personally very important to them. This includes Kazakhstan and Albania, where just 18% and 15%, respectively, say religion is central to their lives. (See "How Much Religion Matters" chart.)

Along with the lower percentages who say religion is very important in their lives, Muslims in Central Asia and across Southern and Eastern Europe also report lower levels of religious practice than Muslims in other regions. For instance, only in Azerbaijan does a majority (70%) pray more than once a day. Elsewhere in these two regions, the number of Muslims who say they pray several times a day ranges from slightly more than four-in-ten in Kosovo (43%), Turkey (43%) and Tajikistan (42%) to fewer than one-in-ten in Albania (7%) and Kazakhstan (4%).

In other regions included in the study, daily prayer is much more common among Muslims. In Southeast Asia, for example, at least three-quarters pray more than once a day, while in the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, majorities in most countries report the same.

Muslims in Central Asia, as well as in Southern and Eastern Europe, also tend to be less observant than their counterparts in other regions when it comes to mosque attendance. Just over four-in-ten Turkish Muslims (44%) say they visit their local mosque once a week or more, while three-in-ten do the same in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the remaining countries, fewer than a quarter of Muslims say they go to worship services at least once a week.

By contrast, outside Central Asia and the Southern-Eastern Europe region, substantially larger percentages of Muslims say they attend mosque once a week or more, although only in sub-Saharan Africa do broad majorities in all countries display this high level of religious commitment.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that despite lower levels of religious commitment on some measures, majorities of Muslims across most of Central Asia and Southern and Eastern Europe nonetheless subscribe to core tenets of Islam, and many also report that they observe such pillars of the faith as fasting during Ramadan and annual almsgiving to the poor.

Generational Differences in Religious Commitment 

Of all the countries surveyed, only in Russia do Muslims ages 18-34 place significantly more importance on religion than Muslims 35 and older (48% vs. 41%). Younger Muslims in Russia also tend to pray more frequently (48% do so once a day or more, compared with 41% of older Muslims). 

Elsewhere in Southern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the older generation of Muslims generally places a greater emphasis on religion and engages more often in prayer. For example, Muslims ages 35 and older are more likely than younger Muslims to pray several times a day in Uzbekistan (+18 percentage points), Tajikistan (+16) and Kyrgyzstan (+8).

The biggest generational differences are found in the Middle East and North Africa. In Lebanon, for example, Muslims ages 35 and older are 28 percentage points more likely than younger Muslims to pray several times a day, 20 points more likely to attend mosque at least weekly and 18 points more likely to read the Quran daily. On each of these measures, age gaps of 10 points or more also are found in the Palestinian territories, Morocco and Tunisia. And somewhat smaller but statistically significant differences are observed as well in Jordan and Egypt.

Women and Men Similar, Except in Mosque Attendance 

Across the six regions included in the survey, women and men tend to be very similar in terms of the role religion plays in daily life. This holds true for the importance that both sexes place on religion, as well as for the frequency with which they observe daily rituals, such as prayer and reading (or listening to) the Quran. For example, among the countries surveyed in Central Asia, a median of 43% of Muslim women say religion is very important in their lives, compared with 42% of men. When it comes to prayer, medians of 31% of women and 28% of men in Central Asia pray several times a day. And nearly equal percentages of women (8%) and men (6%) across the region say they read or listen to the Quran daily.

The one exception to this pattern is mosque attendance: women are much more likely than men to say they never visit their local mosque. This gender gap is largest in South Asia and Central Asia. In South Asia, including Pakistan, a median of about three-quarters of women (77%) say they never attend mosque, compared with just 1% of men. In Central Asia, the comparable figures are 74% and 20%. Gender differences in mosque attendance are smaller, though still significant, in Southern and Eastern Europe (+27 percentage points) and the Middle East-North Africa region (+26 points). There is little or no gap, however, in Southeast Asia (+4) and sub-Saharan Africa (+1).

Sectarian Differences Vary in Importance 

The survey finds that sectarian identities, especially the distinction between Sunni and Shia Muslims, seem to be unfamiliar or unimportant to many Muslims. This is especially true across Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as in Central Asia, where medians of at least 50% describe themselves as “just a Muslim” rather than as a follower of any particular branch of Islam. Substantial minorities in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia also identify as “just a Muslim” (regional medians of 23% and 18%).

Sectarian identities appear to be particularly relevant in South Asia and the Middle East-North Africa region, where majorities identify as Sunnis or Shias. In the Middle East and North Africa, moreover, widespread identification with the Sunni sect is often coupled with mixed views about whether Shias are Muslims.

In five of seven countries surveyed in the Middle East and North Africa, at least four-in-ten or more Sunnis say Shias are not Muslims.⁶ Only in Iraq and Lebanon do overwhelming majorities of Sunnis accept Shias as members of the same faith. Indeed, Sunnis in these two countries are at least 23 to 28 percentage points more likely than Sunnis elsewhere in the region to recognize Shias as Muslims.⁷ 

This greater willingness of Sunnis in Iraq and Lebanon to accept Shias as fellow Muslims extends as well to attitudes about forms of worship traditionally associated with Shias. For example, while most Sunnis in the Middle East and North Africa view pilgrimages to the shrines of saints as falling outside Islamic tradition, majorities of Sunnis in Lebanon (98%) and Iraq (65%) believe this practice is acceptable in Islam. In this regard, Sunnis in these two countries resemble their fellow Shia countrymen more than they resemble Sunnis in neighboring countries such as Egypt and Jordan.

In Lebanon sectarian attitudes vary significantly by age. Lebanese Sunnis who are 35 and older are less willing than younger Sunnis to accept Shias as Muslims. The history of sectarian conflict in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s may help explain the generational difference. Sunnis who came of age during the conflict years are less inclined to view Shias as fellow Muslims. Yet, even with this generational difference, both younger and older Sunnis in Lebanon still are more willing than most Sunnis in the Middle East-North Africa region to say that Shias share the same faith.

Not just in the Middle East and North Africa but in other regions as well, the willingness of Sunnis to accept Shia as fellow Muslims tends to be higher in countries with sizable Shia populations. For example, in Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Russia – countries with self-identified Shia populations ranging from 6% to 37% – clear majorities of Sunnis (both men and women, young and old) agree that Shias belong to the Islamic faith. On the other hand, in Pakistan, where 6% of the survey respondents identify as Shia, Sunni attitudes are more mixed: 50% say Shias are Muslims, while 41% say they are not.

Sunnis and Shias  

Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims (also known as Shiites) comprise the two main branches of Islam. Sunni and Shia identities first formed soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 C.E., centering on a dispute over leadership succession. Over time, however, the political divide between the two groups broadened to include theological distinctions and differences in religious practices as well.

While the two groups are similar in many ways, they differ over conceptions of religious authority and interpretation as well as the role of the Prophet Muhammad’s descendants, among other issues.

Members of Sufi orders, which embrace mystical practices, can fall within either the Sunni or the Shia tradition. In some cases, Sufis may accept teachings from both traditions.

For additional information regarding Sunni and Shia Islam, see John Esposito, editor. 2003. “Shii Islam” and “Sunni Islam” in “The Oxford Dictionary of Islam.” Oxford: Oxford University Press, pages 290-93 and 304-307.

Views of Other Groups 

The survey also asked about attitudes toward Sufis and members of regionally specific groups or movements. Views of Sufis vary greatly by region. In South Asia, for example, a median of 77% consider Sufis to be Muslims; half in the Middle East and North Africa concur. However, significantly fewer Muslims in other regions surveyed accept Sufis as members of the Islamic faith. For example, in Southern and Eastern Europe (Russia and the Balkans), a median of 32% recognize Sufis as fellow Muslims, while in Southeast Asia and Central Asia the comparable figures are 24% and 18%.

Especially in Central Asia, the low percentage that accepts Sufis as Muslims may be linked to a lack of knowledge about this mystical branch of Islam: majorities in most Central Asian countries surveyed say either that they have never heard of Sufis or that they do not have an opinion about whether Sufis are Muslims.

Views of regionally or locally based groups and movements are mixed. For example, in South Asia and Southeast Asia, relatively few Muslims accept Ahmadiyyas as members of the Islamic faith. Only in Bangladesh do as many as four-in-ten recognize members of this movement as fellow Muslims; elsewhere in the two regions, a quarter or fewer agree. Even smaller percentages in Malaysia and Indonesia (9% and 5%, respectively) say that members of the mystical Aliran Kepercayaan movement are Muslims. (See Glossary for brief definitions of these groups.)

In Turkey, most Muslims (69%) acknowledge Alevis, who are part of the Shia tradition, as fellow Muslims. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, a modest majority (57%) say members of the Alawite sect are Muslims. By comparison, only about four-in-ten Lebanese Muslims (39%) say the same about the Druze.

About the Report 

These and other findings are discussed in more detail in the remainder of this report, which is divided into six main sections:

• Religious Affiliation 
• Religious Commitment 
• Articles of Faith 
• Other Beliefs and Practices 
• Boundaries of Religious Identity 
• Boundaries of Religious Practice 

This report also includes an appendix with comparable results from past Pew Research Center surveys of Muslims in the United States. There is also a glossary of key terms. The survey questionnaire and a topline with full results is also available. The report also includes an infographic. This report covers religious affiliation, beliefs and practices. A second report will cover Muslims’ attitudes and views on a variety of social and political questions.

The Pew Forum’s survey of the world’s Muslims includes every nation with a Muslim population of more than 10 million except Algeria, China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Together, the 39 countries and territories included in the survey are home to about two-thirds of all Muslims in the world.

The surveys that are the basis for this report were conducted across multiple years. Fifteen sub-Saharan countries with substantial Muslim populations were surveyed in 2008-2009 as part of a larger project that examined religion in that region. The methods employed in those countries – as well as some of the findings – are detailed in the Pew Forum report “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” An additional 24 countries and territories were surveyed in 2011-2012. In 21 of these countries, Muslims make up a majority of the population. In these cases, nationally representative samples of at least 1,000 respondents were fielded. The number of self-identified Muslims interviewed in these countries ranged from 551 in Lebanon to 1,918 in Bangladesh. In Russia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Muslims are a minority, oversamples were employed to ensure adequate representation of Muslims; in both cases, at least 1,000 Muslims were interviewed. Meanwhile, in Thailand, the survey was limited to the country’s five southern provinces, each with substantial Muslim populations; more than 1,000 interviews with Muslims were conducted across these provinces. Appendix C provides greater detail on the 2011-2012 survey’s methodology.

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Footnotes: 

2 According to Pew Forum estimates, 87-90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis, while 10-13% are Shias. For country-by-country estimates of the percentage of Sunnis and Shias, see the Pew Forum’s 2009 report “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” page 38. (return to text) 

3 For background on Sufi orders, see the Pew Forum’s 2010 report “Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe.” (return to text) 

4 Enumerations and translations of the articles of faith vary. Most are derived from the Hadith of Gabriel. See, for example, Sahih al-Bukhari 2:47 and Sahih al-Muslim 1:1. For details on hadith, see text box in Chapter 3. (return to text) 

5 In 2008-2009, the Pew Forum asked both Muslims and Christians in sub-Saharan Africa if the sacred texts of their respective religions are the word of God and should be taken literally. The results are reported in the 2010 report “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” (return to text) 

6 Questions about views of Muslim sects were not asked in sub-Saharan Africa. (return to text) 

7 All figures for Shia and Sunni subgroups within countries are based on self-identification in response to a multi-part survey question that first asked if an individual was Muslim (Q28 and Q28b), and if yes, if they were Sunni, Shia or “something else” (Q31). The percentage of Shias and Sunnis identified by the survey may diverge from country estimates reported in the Pew Forum’s 2009 report “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” which are based on demographic and ethnographic analyses, as well as reviews of frequently used estimates. (return to text) 

Photo Credit: © SZE FEI WONG / istockphoto

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