Wednesday, April 13, 2011

International Relations in Islam

International Relations in Islam lecture series - 1 (A Response to Insults/Extremism)

Lecture 1 – 10.02.2006

A series of talks delivered by Shaykh Seraj Hendricks on International Relations in Islam based on the classic work 'Alaqat Ad-Dauliya by Imam Muhammad Abu Zahra

The response of any insult toward Islam, is one that should be rooted in the Sunnah of Muhammad (saw). On record, there are very few people who were more persecuted that Muhammad (saw). The entire sira (history) of Muhammad (saw) testifies to it. [We see the warnings of Muhammad (saw) now needed so much concerning extremism as we live in a time where fanaticism and extremism are rampant]

Muslims can be proud that they were never in history responsible for the mass killings that others have brought fourth. If one looks at the access, which Europe has to mass weapons of destruction then it appears to be or is more than what Muslims have today, but there is one thing we have and that is the example of Muhammad (saw), which is alive. Figures become dim over time but for us as Muslims we live with this Sunnah of Muhammad (saw) everyday. He is the greatest figure, a figure that we revere. What ever problems we face (divorce or marrige etc) we turn to Muhammad (saw). We look at how he conducted these issues. He is our mentor and this we cannot negotiate and even compromise about.

People drawing cartoons about Muhammad (saw) – here we need to look how he (saw) responded to these kinds of things. There is no doubt that the cartoons drawn about Muhammad (saw) a while back were found despicable by every Muslim child and adult male and female.
A problem is that when we respond, we want to respond in kind. How did the great Mujahidin respond when they were belittled or when they were in Jihad or fighting for there rights to live? How did the Mujahidin engage a power wanting to destroy them? There are magnificent stories and we need to look back at history to understand why history reveres these men, look back at people, at the lives of people like Salahudin Ayubi and then compare them to the modern day counterparts who speak in the name of Jihad.

We are not soft in the face of oppression and persecution, this is what extremists say about us, that we are sitting down and are too soft. One thing we do have is the Sunnah of Muhammad (saw) and we do have the Qur'an, which acts as our ultimate guideline.

The Qur'an tells us,

????? ????????? ??????????? ????? ???????????? ??????? ????????? ???? ???????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ?????????? ????????? ????????? ??????? ???????

This ayah came down as a result of the persecution of Muhammad (saw) and his Sahaba's growing discontent and agitation. The Mushrikin didn't call him Muhammad (saw); they called him Muthammam – meaning the debased. The people who embraced Islam in His time were massacred and persecuted to an extraordinary kind.

A Jewish lady who was a neighbor of his poured trash on his door step everyday – these examples are in Sahih Bukhari. On the day she stopped throwing this trash on his door step, He (saw) went to look for her and found her sick in bed. She embraced Islam immediately.
Because of all these things the Sahaba became greatly annoyed and what did they want to do? They wanted to respond in kind and that is the reason why the ayah came down:

??? ????????? ??????????? ????? ????????????

(Is there a difference between evil and good) means, there is a huge difference between them. This is a rhetorical question – is there any difference between a wicked person, wickedness and goodness? Then the answer,

??????? ????????? ???? ????????

When you repel the evil (sayyiah) like cartoons drawn about Prophets etc. (Repel [the evil] with one, which is better) means, `when someone does you wrong, repel him by what is better,'Why?

??????? ??????? ???????? ?????????? ????????? ????????? ??????? ???????

By upholding the values of Ihsan in our responses to things, then it is possible that between you and he whom there is animosity, it is possible that this person can become your warmest friend. This is what the Quran is telling us. It is not telling us to repel this kind of evil with revenge at all. When you repel, repel in the spirit of Islam and this was the response of Muhammad (saw).
'Aysha (R) says, 'Verily, the character of the Messenger of Allah was the Qur'an.''

Allah (S) goes on to say,

????? ??????????? ?????? ????????? ?????????

(But none is granted it except those who are patient) meaning, no one accepts this advice and works according to it, except for those who can be patient in doing so, for it is difficult for people to do.

????? ??????????? ?????? ??? ????? ???????

`Ali bin Abi Talhah reported that Ibn `Abbas explained this Ayah: "Allah commands the believers to be patient when they feel angry, to be forbearing when confronted with ignorance, and to forgive when they are mistreated.

We have to be so careful because the Din is not about me or you as a person. Islam is bigger than you and I and our duty is raise ourselves up to the level required.

We are not allowed to respond by burning things down, we are not allowed to respond with fire. This is pointed out in Bukhari by Muhammad (saw) – saydina 'Ali was persecuted, made fun of and insulted. When they proposed that 'Abdullah bin 'Ubay should be burnt, Saydina 'Ali said no, this is not the way (together with ibn 'Abbas and others). He said that there is no crime that can merit burning things. It is simply not a Muslim response if we feel we have been insulted or Muhammad (saw) has been insulted, yes we can speak out but our response is critical.

When we speak in the name of Islam, we are speaking in the name of Muhammad (saw) as well and his image has to be protected
When we look at a group of people, do we only take note of the rotten apples and say that this is the potential this group has or do we look at those who excel and say that this is the potential the group has?

Do we reduce the human being to his faults or do we see more to the next person that the faults we see in him or her?

These are questions we need to ask ourselves if you want to follow the prophet then look for seventy excuses for a person whom you think is bad, make an excuse for the person

There are far few prophets in history that has such an accessible history than Muhammad (saw) and this is part of our blessing, which we can turn as if it happened yesterday and look at the Sirah of Muhammad (saw)

Three years of boycotting, many commentators say that after six months of this, Saydina Hadija died. A while after that Abu Talib passed away, because of the pressures of these boycotts. He saw people and children dying on a weekly basis because of these things and this was what Muhammad (saw) had to live with.

Then he went to Ta'if where he tried to speak about Allah but he was pelted out of Ta'if by children leaving his ankles to bleed. When Allah sent Gabriel (as) to him (saw) and gave him the choice of destroying the people of Ta'f, what was Muhammad (saw)'s response?
He said, 'Do not destroy them, for perhaps one day there children might just accept Islam'.

This is the portrait of the prophet and this is what we need to hold onto.

When he went into his final victory into Makkah and he handed the banner over to Abu Ubaada and Abu Ubaada said,' Today is a day of slaughtering. You who considered yourself inviolable, (he is speaking to the Quraysh) you will today be violated'.

Abu Sufyan panicked and went over to the prophet and said to him,
'Is this what you are going to do to us today?'

And the prophets response was, Today is a day of mercy for you. While you have violated us, Islam has today elevated Quraysh. (He (saw) then got onto a rock and said, 'What do you think I will do to you today?

They replied, 'You are Akh al Karim ibn Akh al-Karim – you are noble and the son of a nobleman and he (saw) says, 'All of you (meaning all of them who persecuted him, raped there women etc)… you are all forgiven today'. While he talks, the following happens: This woman runs across crying as she sees her son, they were split up from the children for long periods. She held him and cried.

This was a moment when emotions were high and if Muhammad (saw) had ordered the Muslim to destroy the Quraysh they would have carried out is command but he had a responsibility. Saydina 'Umr, Abu Bakr and 'Ali, etc. see this women running to her child crying and holing the child. Muhammad (saw) sees them looking on and says to them, 'the compassion Allah (S) has towards you and these people is greater than the compassion this women is showing to her child'. And they all cried.

This was the way in which Muhammad (saw) conducted his affairs.
This is a prophet and no cartoon or insult can ever reduce Him (saw)
This is our example and not the recklessness and anger of other people.

We have to live up to this as we are the carriers of this message
He is the cause of every one in five people walking on this planet being Muslim.

The Quran says to Muhammad (saw), 'If you were hard hearted, your companions would have fled from you' and rightfully so.

He always had a smile on his face, except for sometimes like in his Khutbas.

He lived up to his word when he said that smiling to your brother is sadaqah (charity)

We have to ask ourselves before acting, 'What would Muhammad (saw) have done?'

What is the difference with the person who draws a picture of Muhammad (saw) with a nuclear bomb on his head and the person who acts like an animal screaming with no Adab in the streets – both are distorting the message of Muhammad (Saw).


And Allah knows best


(And among us let us not become our own worst enemy!)

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Islam and Pluralism

Does the Quran Approve Religious Pluralism?

By Ali İhsan Yitik

As for the relation between Islam and pluralism, it seems a little bit complicated. There are some verses in The Koran for pluralism and at the same time we have some verses against. Among the sayings of Prophet Muhammad like the some Koranic verses, we came across with something good and bad for non-Muslims in special contexts. By another saying, we find both positive and negative statements for Jews and Christians in different circumstances (1). Muslim scholars the complexity still exists. We find both positive and negative stances. So it is difficult to see a standard or official view on this issue (2). However, we should point out that Islam recognizes all the sacred (Semitic) books and their messages. It accepts all prophets of that traditions. It defines itself as the last and perfect religion of Semitic tradition and states that no other religion will be accepted from anybody else other then itself (3). It criticizes both the Jews and Christians especially about their failure to uphold the Oneness of God, tawhid, and to preserve the authenticity of their scripture from interventions. This exclusivist aspect of Islam as many conservative scholars (4) formed with putting together some evidences from the Koran is generally accepted by Muslims. For Islam, Muhammad is not different from other prophets in explaining the religion of Abraham (5), but on the other hand, in addition to other prophets everybody is expected to recognize him since, as the last prophet, he calls for the true religion of Abraham: Islam.

The problem of pluralism emerges not at socio-cultural level, but at the religious sphere. For instance it comes out as a problem when we talk about salvation. Long before the emergence of the problem of pluralism as a philosophical matter, Muslims had discussed this topic for centuries not only for Jews and Christians but also for anybody who had heard nothing about God and his messages. Beyond all, there is another discussion in Islam about the meaning of the word of Islam itself. Arabic word “Islam” can mean two things: first the term with a capital “I”, refers to the institutionalized religion, i.e. Islam that is highly favored and vehemently supported by the exclusivist scholars. The second meaning is the literal meaning of the word “Islam” i.e. “submission to the Will of God” which is widely accepted by the advocates of inclusivism or pluralism. So, if we chose to accept the second meaning of Islam, it includes all monotheistic believers. That’s the point. Only these discussions are good advantages and positive sides for pluralism on behalf of Islam.

As it’s understood so far and will be shown below with some verses from The Koran, Islam at theological level is inclusive to all Semitic Religions with their Prophets and Abrahamic messages (with the stress upon the Oneness of God and His uniqueness beyond all material world). What Islam excludes (rejects) is paganism and disbelief of a Supreme Being at theoretical level. Despite this exclusivist approach to unbelievers, Islam proclaims peaceful coexistence with them and calls Muslims to have a good dialogue even during discussion: “Call thou to the way of the thy Lord with wisdom and good admonition, and dispute with them in the better way” (16:125). “Let him who will, believe, let him who will, reject (faith)” (18: 29). “Say: O unbelievers, I worship not what you worship and you are not worshiping what I worship nor am I worshiping what you have worshiped, neither are you worshiping what I worship. To you your religion and to me my religion”. (The Koran, 109:1-6)

At any rate, there is no doubt that Islam as a religion and Muslims as a community are more pluralistic at socio-cultural level than the Jews and Christians. And sometimes it’s exclusivist as much as Judaism or Christianity due to some historical or political reasons. If we claim that Islam (or Muslims) is also more successful than others in dealing with cultural differences, we shouldn’t exaggerate at all. This fact has been proved in some historical places like Istanbul, Jerusalem and Cairo and even in Christian Spain or in the Balkan Peninsula. Now we can see some roots of theological inclusivism or by another saying religious pluralism in Islam: In early and medieval Islam, we see that some Muslim scholars approached pluralism within the context of Islamic jurisprudence, for determining the status of non-Muslims. And also theologians tangled with this issue. From this approach, we know the existence of others is a real practical problem like an issue of faith. We know that some contemporary Muslim scholors, for example Prof. Süleyman Ateş in Turkey started the discussion of the Koranic verses for pluralism claiming “Nobody has monopoly over paradise”.

Islam regards Judaism and Christianity, their founders and scriptures not only as a matter of culture or a problem of society but also as a matter of belief. Accepting their Abrahamic roots is not courtesy but acknowledgement of religious truth. Islam regards them in the world not as ‘other views’ that it has to tolerate, but as standing de jure as religions from the same God. A special place is reserved for them. The Banû Israel (Jews) and Nasâra (Christians) are grouped under the common name of the “People of the Book”: Ahl al-Kitâb. Their legitimate status is neither sociopolitical, nor cultural or civilizational, but religious. In this situation, Islam seems very unique among great religions. As al-Farûki says that “there is no religion in the world has yet made belief in the truth of others religions a necessary condition of its own faith and witness” (6). Beyond recognizing them, The Koran makes a great compliment to Christians: “And nearest among them in love to the Believers will thou find those who say: We are Christians, because amongst these are priests and monks, and they are not arrogant” (5:82)

As Süleyman Ateş points out (7), in Islam there are three basic principles: If anybody believes in the absolute oneness of God, to worship none but Him, believes in the Hereafter without a doubt and does good deeds then deserves salvation theologically (8). For him, “Allah is the god of Love, merciful and compassionate. Thus his “mercy embraces everything” (The Koran, 7:156) so according to him, we shouldn’t be narrowing down the Koranic message to our local and limited comprehension.

Islam recognizes old scriptures and prophets and simply states, “O ye who believe! Believe in God and His apostle, and the scripture, He hath sent to those before (him). Any who denieth God, His angels, His books, His apostles, and the Day of Judgment, hath gone far, far astray”. (The Koran 4: 136). “Those who believe (in the Koran), those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Sabians and the Christians-any who believe in Allah and the Last Day and work righteousness- on them shall be no fear nor shall they grieve” (The Koran, 5:59).

For Islam, the messages of the prophets throughout ages are one and the same. “Were you witnesses when death appeared before Jacob? Behold, he said to his sons: “What will you worship after me? “They said: “We shall worship your God and the God of your holy fathers-of Abraham, Ismail and Isaac, -the One (true) God, to Him we bow in Islam” (The Koran, 2:133).

For Islam nobody should be forced to convert or to adopt Islam by any means or under any circumstances. “Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: Whoever rejects Evil and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy handhold, that never, breaks. And God hears and knows all things” (2: 256) [9]. Prophet Muhammad implemented the requirements of this verse and prohibited his companions from compelling people to accept Islam. Belief is valuable when freedom of choice is in place.

The Koran wants people to have a good relation with others. “O mankind! Verily we have created you of a male and female; and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. Lo! The noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct. Lo! Allah is Knower, Aware” (Koran 49: 13). From this verse we understand that God created people from a mother and a father, His wisdom decreed that they are made into tribes and nations, who despite their multitude and variety, descend from the same origin. While different in language, color, culture, homeland and means of power, they worship to the one God. No people can be Master of another, or a color superior to another, since they descend from the same origin and turn to the same God. People should know each other with setting up good relations and shouldn’t try to view one another with mutual suspicion, malice and hatred. Thus Islam eliminates the all kinds of discriminations from its racial and ethnological concept and establishes mutual acquaintance among people as it was shown in the early period of Islamic history at best level.

When Prophet Muhammad first received the divine revelation, his wife Khadija took him to her relative Waraqa bin Nawfal, “who had some knowledge of the Bible and may have been a Christian” (10). Waraqa reassured Muhammad that what he experienced was similar to what had happened to Moses and was a divine revelation; When the number of Muslims increased in Mecca and they were persecuted by the pagan Meccans, “the Negus of Abysssina –who ruled over a Nestorian Christian kingdom gave them refuge and accepted a group of emigrant Muslims into his country in 616 / 618 CE. Pagans applied to him for extradition of Muslims on the grounds that Muslims neither liked Christians nor respected Christianity. But the king refused the deportation of Muslims after listening to what Muslims had to say about Jesus as a major prophet (11); When Prophet Muhammad arrived in Medine, he established a relation and value system which connects people through religion and citizenship. Immediately after he settled in Medine, The Prophet formed a constitution, a treaty which regulates the affairs of all the inhabitants of Medina, and signed a pact with the Jews: in article 25: “The Jews of Banu ‘Avf are a community (ummah) along with the believers. To the Jews their religion (din) and to the Muslims their religion…” In article 37: It is for the Jews to bear their expenses and for the Muslims to bear their expenses. Between them (That is to one another) there is help (nasr) against whoever wars against the people of this document. Between them is sincere friendship and honorable dealing, not treachery…” (12). Later, the Prophet extended the act of citizenship and co-operation to the Christians of Najran: “This is a letter from Muhammad the prophet, The Messenger of God, to the people of Najran… Najran and their followers have protection (jiwar) of God and the dhimmah of Muhammad the prophet, the Messenger of God, for themselves, their community, their land, and their goods, both those who are absent and those who are present, and for their churches and services (no bishop will be moved from his episcopate, and no monk from his monastic position, and no church-warden from his church-wardenship) and for all, great or little, that is under their hands” (13).

In Islamic culture, the term al-dhimmah is formed to define the status of such groups of people as the Jews and Christians who lived within the Islamic political domain. It means pact, trust, surety A Dhimmi is a party to covenant who has been given a promise to feel secure about his property, honor and religion. Al-dhimmah grants the Christians and Jews an equal status with Muslims in religious, economic and administrative domains. In return they are asked to pay, jizyah, the poll tax. Although the al-dhimmah status itself was initiated for Christians and Jews, it was also applied to Zoroeastrians when Persia was conquered and to Hindus and Buddhists when India came under the rule of Islam (14). The Prophet said that, “Feed the hungry, visit the sick and release the captive” (15). This order was not only for Muslims or their people, but also it was a duty for Muslims to do for others as well as the Prophet did. He paid a visit to a young Jew who felt ill, which means that it is permissible to visit, compliment and entertain them.

The constitution of Medine, and other covenants of the Prophet with Jews and Christians, laid down the principles for building a multi-cultural and multi-religious community. These fundamental rules that the Prophet established have been practiced throughout Islamic history (16). After prophet Muhammad, the caliphs and Muslims in general fallowed the same way: When Jerusalem came under the rule of Islam, Omar the second caliph, signed a pact with the inhabitants of Jerusalem, which granted security for them and their property. It recognized rights of the Jews and Christians of Jerusalem freely to practice their religion; their churches and synagogues were respected and left intact (17).

Non-Muslims have always been encouraged to participate in and contribute to the intellectual and political life of the community under Islamic rules. The Christians and Jews were welcomed to hold posts in public offices. Some of them became ministers, especially in the periods of The Abbasids, Mamluks and Ottomans. Religious tolerance was well observed by the Muslim rulers of Christian Spain. At that time, in Spanish cities like Cordova, Seville and Toledo, Christians, Jews and Muslims lived in peaceful co-existence (18) and many distinguished scholars and philosophers played a crucial role for exchanging cultures, the most famous of whom was Moses Maimonides.

In Islamic history, religious persecution of the members of other faiths was almost absent. The rule “Let there be no compulsion in religion” has banned Muslims from practicing what is called religious persecution against non-Muslims. Jews and Christians under Muslim rule were not subject to exile, apostasy or death, which was the choice offered to Muslims and Jews in re-conquered Spain. And Christians and Jews were not subject to any major territorial and occupational restrictions such as were the common lot of Jews in pre-modern Europe (19).

We always think that the severe and some bad experiences humanity lived at past happened somehow and will never occur again in our times or in the future. But unfortunately this is a sweet illusion and only a good wishing. Humanity lives the same experience to some extent and unfortunately some of them are in a struggle with the bitter problems. If we want to do something really helpful in order to reach a pluralist society or to prevent conflicts at any level, we should first check and reform our social, cultural and religious acceptances (maybe prejudices) against others with eliminating our exclusive sides and bring humanistic values. Historical situations (esp. some religious and cultural conflicts in the Balkans, esp. in the last two hundred years) should be a good lesson for Balkan people for seeing their future better

It is very clear that the Old Testament for the Jews, the New Testament for Christians and the Koran for Muslims are above all religious messages. Despite that, Jews, Muslims and Christians aim at constituting a universal form of true unique monotheism (20). So there is no reason for not realizing an interactive dialogue and mutual understanding between them for a peaceful world esp. for a peaceful Middle East and world. They have to go beyond some dialogue meetings and reach at some points in which their children should learn that they are following same tradition and no reason to be distant from or aggressive against each other.

Journal of Religious Culture
Nr. 68 (2004)
ISSN 1434-5935- © E.Weber

Thursday, February 17, 2011

Capitalism and Islamic Economics: what's the difference?

Is there any real difference between the Capitalist and the Islamic economic system? Both systems allow you to make money, but they are completely different in how money is accumulated and spent. The reasons for such great differences is the source and hence, the ultimate goal of each system.

Capitalism is based on the concept that economics is that which examines man's needs, which are unlimited and how to satisfy these unlimited needs. The system depends upon the separation of church and state or in other words, the separation of the Creator from life's affairs. The concept of freedom plays a major role in the Capitalist ideology. Freedom is guaranteed by the state, therefore, man is totally free to satisfy his needs in any manner possible as long as he does not legally infringe on the freedom of others. One needs only to look onto the streets around us to see the devastating results of this form of system. It is because of the freedom of satisfying needs that the pornography and alcohol/drug industry are two of the biggest profit making businesses in the Capitalist system. Is this the type of society in which we want to live and raise our children?

The Islamic economic system is derived from the a source that satisfies the needs and desires of all people. The source of these rules is their Creator. Islam, as the Diin of the Creator, attends to all the needs of mankind. It sets guidelines on how these needs and desires are to be fulfilled. As human beings, we have the freedom to use our minds to prove that a Creator does exist, and that Islam is the Creator's mercy to us to guide our lives and live it with purpose. Once we accept Islam freely, we then follow the rules of Islam. This shows how Islam defines the freedom in our lives. Freedom is living by the best system possible, not creating a system that destroys the lives of people.

Capitalism is also based on the theory of relative scarcity. This means that there always has to be a real or as in the majority of cases, a forces insufficiency of commodities to meet the needs of the people. This is not in keeping with the reality life. Today, there are more than enough goods and commodities to satisfy the needs of everyone, but because this in fact, contradicts the principle of relative scarcity, some people are left without the fulfillment of their basic needs of food, shelter, and clothing while others seem to have too much of one or more. This theory divides the society such that a small percentage of people hoard almost all the wealth while the rest of society struggles to have a home and food.

Islam does not share this idea of relative scarcity. Islam does not allow this to happen. The basic needs are guaranteed to every Muslim and non-Muslim living under the rule of Islam. These needs include the tangible, such as adequate food, clothing, and shelter, as well as the intangible, such as medicine, education and security. The primary goal is to have everyone producing and everyone consuming.

The Islamic economic system is not based on price as the method of distribution of goods, but rather, how to distribute funds and benefits to all citizens. With the basic needs satisfied, everyone can live a happier life because people are allowed to search for the livelihood that suits them best and makes them the happiest. The whole society prospers from this system because when people are doing what makes them happy instead of only what makes them money, they are more successful and productive. There may be great economic differences among the people and the means to have the basics for life will be provided for all. This takes into account the fact that people have different skills, motivational levels and entrepreneurial desires and there is no sin in high earnings. The Islamic economic system is just a part of Islam. It cannot be separated from it and discussed as an individual component.

http://www.sa.niu.edu/msa/articles/capitalism.htm

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Islamic Revival or Political Islam Against the Occupiers?: A Broad View

Political Islam in the Middle East

Are Knudsen

R 2003: 3

© Chr. Michelsen Institute 2003 (Development Studies and Human Rights)

ISSN 0805-505X
ISBN 82-8062-043-5

[Out of seven world regions, the Arab countries had the lowest freedom score in the late 1990s (UNDP 2002: p. 27).]

Introduction

The resurgence of Islam, now commonly referred to as “political Islam”, is generally attributed to the crushing military defeats of Arabic countries suffered at the hands of Israeli forces in 1967 (Milton-Edwards 2000: p. 123). This defeat marked the end of panArabism and the start of an Islamic revival that grew to challenge nation-states in the Middle East.


Old Islamism” or “New Islamism

This report has shown that most of the contemporary research is devoted to what may be termed the “Old Islamism”, whose main attribute is the alleged threat Islamic fundamentalism poses to secular regimes in the Middle East and Western democracies
considered enemies of Islam. This essentialist “gloom and doom” approach foregrounds what John Esposito has called the triple threat of Islam: demographic, political and civilisational. As François Burgat (2002: p. xvi) has noted;

"by confining itself to this misleading perspective, the West is depriving itself of understanding that at least part of the demands voiced by this generation of Islamists is no more illegitimate than those expressed by their nationalist fathers in their time (who also had to revert to violence mutatis mutandis)”.

Many analysts will, however, consider Burgat’s approach apologetic” and conveniently masking the fact that the inherent programme of political Islam is undemocratic and totalitarian (see, Salla 1997). As James Craig notes (2001), Islam, which should otherwise be considered an “enviable asset” of Muslim countries, is castigated as a scourge that keeps people forever stuck in a medieval and barbaric past or, at best, as an obstacle to peaceful progress and economic and democratic liberalisation. The fronts between these two opposing views on Islam are harsh and uncompromising and the battle between the “apologists” (contingenists) and “orientalists” (essentialists) is set to dominate research on Islamism for years to come (Milton-Edwards 2002: p. 39).

In order to move the debate beyond this divide, there is a need for a more nuanced perspective on the Islamist movements in the Middle East. First, while most of the scholarly work is on the fringe Islamist movements known for their use of violence, there is a tendency to neglect the quietist groups that condemn the use of violence and are committed to peaceful protest despite the brutal suppression of political dissent that is common to many Middle East countries. In order to get a better grasp of the breadth of the Islamist movement, there is a need for a new perspective along the lines suggested by Beverley Milton-Edwards (2002: p. 48), who advocates a greater emphasis on long-term fieldwork to build first-hand knowledge of Islamist groups, their leaders and adherents. Moreover, there is also a need to engage with scholars in the Middle East whose research is often ignored or passed over.

This also fits in with the fact that we know comparatively little about the grassroots’ members of the Islamist movements and the popular sentiments they embody. There is, hence, a need to continue along the lines of Saad Eddin Ebrahim’s (1980) pioneering study of the populist bases of Egyptian Islamists as well as more recent work on the sociospatial dimension of contemporary Islamism (see, Ismail 2000, on Egypt). Such studies may also contribute to developing theories of Islamist movements in general.In particular there seems to be a need for studying the dynamics of contemporary social movements as vehicles of the Islamist revival. While the study of Islam and social movements is not a novel theme (see, Lapidus and Burke 1988, Zubaida 1993), and in fact Islam began as a social movement, more attention needs to be paid to modern Islamic movements (see review by, Edelman 2001). Especially, it seems important, as Moaddel (2002b: p. 379) has suggested, to engage in a comparative analysis of Islamic movements in the Middle East.

As Moaddel (2002b) has pointed out, there is a range of competing theories as to what are the driving forces behind the Islamist revival. None of them is capable of accounting for the diversity of the popular support for political Islam throughout the Middle East (see, Woltering 2002), but each seeks to explain them as an outcome of a combination of social (injustice), political (oppression) and religious (secularism) factors. Most probably the revival is caused a number of contingent factors, hence the importance of cautioning against simplistic accounts of what is in reality highly complex phenomenon (see, MiltonEdwards 2000: p. 134). Research that attempts to highlight this complexity wouldtherefore be particularly important.

There is also reason to caution against research on “Islamic terrorism” that reiterates dogmatic accounts of Islam and the Sharia’s inherent tendency towards violence and terrorism. This is reflected in the tendency to give precedence to the most violent movements (Bangstad 2002: p. 6) and to portraying the views of their leaders (Appleby 1997, JPS 2002) rather than those of their members and supporters. There is as yet little serious research on violence perpetrated in the name of religion (but see, Juergensmeyer 2000) compared to the many simplistic accounts touting the threat of a “holy war” based on a biased reading Islam’s founding texts.
This also fits in with the call for a greater concern with the Muslim discourse rather than Islamic beliefs per se. This line of reasoning takes as its starting point that rather than shared beliefs, “political Islam became a potent revolutionary force precisely because it meant different things to different people” Moaddel (2002b: p. 379). This view is echoed by Graham Fuller (2002: p. 50), who finds that “Islamism has become, in fact, the primary vehicle and vocabulary of most political discourse throughout the Muslim world”. From this perspective, Islamism is not a spent force locked in decline, but able to articulate political dissent and popular discontent in such a way as to remain a potent political
movement. It is exactly this capacity for development within the Islamist movement that is suggested by James Piscatori (2002), who argues that:

"One way is to assume that ideological rigidity or perhaps incoherence renders Islamism incapable of real development; it is, therefore, destined to fail. Another possibility, however, is that the very ambiguity of Islamist thought, in addition to providing the practical advantage of attracting a broad constituency, allows space
for the flexible development of talismanic ideas such as the Islamic state.” If this view is taken, then, far from being destined to decline, Islamism is capable of adaptation and growth."

The latter perspective is central to the prospect for a democratic transformation of the Islamist movement, what has been termed the “New Islamism” (Langohr 2001). This perspective has been advanced among others by Anthony Shadid (2002), who in particular emphasised the transformation of the Lebanese Hizbollah as well as the Egyptian Centre Party as examples of the current democratic trend. Shadid is not alone in seeing Islamic movements being recast. In a forthcoming book Oliver Roy (2003) argues that the Islamist movements are relinquishing their international agenda in favour of a nationalist framework. More research on this and other aspects of the remaking of the Islamist movement in the Middle East is important not only for its theoretical implications, but more so, to counter the stereotypical portrayal of the Islamist movements as irrational, undemocratic and violent.

Theories

There are currently a large number of books and articles on all aspects of political Islam in the Middle East, but it is rarer to see any explicit theorising aimed at explaining the Islamic revival itself. In many studies there is an implicit assumption that the revival is a result of relative deprivation (see, Gurr 1970), in particular oppressive state policies and social injustice. A general problem with these assumptions is that they may explain the revival in some countries in the Middle East but not in others. At the moment, there seems to be no single theory that can account for the many “faces” of political Islam in such diverse settings as, for example, Turkey (democratic Islamism), Iran (Islamic revolution), Egypt (Islamist opposition) and Algeria (Islamist terror). In this section a range of theories (or rather, theory clusters) are presented under three broad headings: civilisational, social and textual.

The first theory cluster is made up of macro-sociological theories aiming at explaining the dynamics of Islamic civilisations internally (dynastic theories), and externally vis-à-vis an external power (civilisational theories). Next, a second cluster of theories that focus on social processes is reviewed. They locate the Islamic revival not in religion but in the social and political context in which it embedded (crisis theories, cultural duality theories, state culture theories and resurgency theory). The third theory cluster locates the Islamic revival in Islam’s founding texts and doctrine as well as religious worship. In the first instance, Islam is considered a shared discourse (beliefs, rituals and symbols) that is shaped by local socio-political conditions (discursive theories). Alternatively, the starting point is that Muslim activists are united by a shared belief in Islam as an alternative to secular ideologies, creating a potent socio-political force (textualist theories).

Dynastic theories

The first sociological theory of the foundations of the Islamic state and the tension between political (royalty) and religious leadership (caliphate) was developed by the medieval historian Ibn Khaldun (1333–1406) in his masterpiece, Muqaddimah (1377 (1967)). In this book he developed a sociological and historiographic account of the cyclical rise and fall of urban civilisations. The main reason for this, Khaldun argued, was the gradual erosion of the cement of society so to speak, namely “group solidarity” (asabiyya). Group solidarity and military prowess was a defining feature of nomadic tribes and this enabled them to overwhelm and conquer urban civilisation and develop a new dynasty on its ruins. Over time, however, the new dynasty would itself succumb to weakening solidarity among its populace and excesses by its rulers and fall prey to nomadic conquerors. Importantly, Khaldun argued that the only way to create an enduring state was to find a lasting alternative to asabiyya, one that was based not on social solidarity but on the religious authority of the Sharia. Nonetheless, we find in Khaldun’s work an early argument in favour of “the differentiation between religious and secular leadership” (Moaddel 2002b: p. 367), a philosophical problem that had engaged Muslim thinkers since the end of the reign of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (632–1258).

Civilisational theories

Ibn Khaldun’s seminal work may be considered a precursor to the civilisational theories with its emphasis on the antithetic relations between opposing entities destined for an apocalyptic conflict. The idea of a civilisational clash has long been a powerful metaphor in which to interpret the Islamist revival and the Islamic Middle East as a predatory civilisation threatening the West (Ahmed 2002). This notion was elevated to scientific theory with the publishing of Samuel Huntington’s article in Foreign Affairs, titled “The Clash of Civilizations?” (1993). In this article and the subsequent book with the same title, he warned that the fault lines of modern conflict will be not empires or states but “civilizations” (Huntington 1996).

Huntington lists a total of eight discrete civilisations and proposes that conflict between them will result in a cataclysmic endgame threatening world peace. This in particular will occur along the fault lines between the “Islamic” and the “Judeo-Christian” civilisations. Huntington’s thesis has been debunked both on normative (Salla 1997) and empirical grounds (Fox 2001, Russett et al. 2000). In order to understand the normative aspect of Huntington’s position it seems important to consider Michael Salla’s (1997) distinction between “essentialists” and “contingenists”. In short, Salla argues that “essentialists” such as Huntington, Daniel Pipes and Bernard Lewis give prominence to the textual interpretation of Islam, which they consider an enduring and immutable insight into the essence of Islam and the Muslim world. They maintain that Islam is a monolithic threat to the West (see, Knudsen 2002a: pp. 10-11). It is therefore important to find ways to neutralise this threat, especially for the US, which is the principal target of Islamist terrorism (Pinto 1999). Opposed to this view we find scholars insisting on the diversity of Islamic movements and on their being shaped by contingent factors, hence the label “contingenists”. Among its most prominent members we find John
Esposito, Edward Said and James Piscatori. They advocate a more cautious approach, one that acknowledges that Islam can serve as a vehicle for social progress and that Islam’s diversity is both more liberal and more democratic than is often acknowledged (see DEMOCRACY). Among its many detractors, this view is often criticised as being “apologetic” and failing to acknowledge the intimidating side of political Islam that curbs freedom of expression and threatens legitimate governments.

Crisis theories

The crisis theories take as their starting point that the Islamic revival is a response to various forms of economic, political and cultural crisis (Moaddel 2002b: p. 371). In general, this approach includes a large number of explanatory variables but lacks a model for how they may be interconnected. The theory can also be questioned on empirical grounds. Neither the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1920s, 1930s), the growing Islamic activism in Iran in the 1960s, nor radical Islamism in Algeria, Jordan and Syria in the 1960s and 1970s were periods characterised by profound economic crisis. These examples, hence, show that the Islamic revival cannot be explained as a popular response to economic decline and the failure of modernisation. Moreover, the bulk of the supporters and leaders of the Islamist movements belonged to the new middle class, further undermining the view that fundamentalism was simply a result of popular discontent by the disenfranchised lumpenproletariat (ibid.).

Cultural duality theories

Seeking to overcome the many shortcomings of the crisis theories, the cultural duality theories posit a tension between the power of the state and the religious leadership (Moaddel 2002b: p. 372). When the state seeks to limit the authority of the religious clergy and remove their privileges, this sparks a countervailing reaction of political opposition. The theory is especially applicable to Shia Islam, where the clergy has a more autonomous position than in Sunni Islam. The cultural duality models have been used to explain, first of all, the rise of revolutionary movements in Iran. This theory seeks to explain the Iranian revolution (1977–79) by reference to the independent religious position of the Shii ulama (clergy), which accounts for their ability to challenge the state successfully. While the theory does show the tension between religion and regime, it fails to explain the broad-based appeal of political opposition expressed through revivalist Islamic movements (ibid.).

State culture theories

Like the cultural duality theories, state culture theories seek to explain Islamic revival as an outcome of the tension between regime and religion, but adopt a more dynamic approach to shifts in state policies and religious discourse (Moaddel 2002b: p. 373). Attempts by the state to invade the religious domain, constrain religious expression or otherwise shift the balance of power in their favour are believed to cause an Islamist backlash. Empirical examples in favour of this theory are the rise of radical Islamism in Algeria in the early 1970s following land reform and leftist polices that alienated large sections of society from the regime (see POLITICAL VIOLENCE). In the same vein the radicalisation of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers was a response to increasing authoritarianism after the military coup in 1952. The assassination of the MB founder Hassan al-Banna, and torture of its members served to further radicalize the MB as well as its chief ideologue, Sayyid Qutb (see
INTRODUCTION). These incidents induced the MB to abandon its former policy and develop a militant agenda that was in stark contrast to the movement’s moderate stance in the 1930s and 40s (Kepel 1985). On a more general level, the state culture theory may be used to explain a cultural conflict between Islam and secularism, and how extreme examples of the latter, what Esposito has termed “militant secular fundamentalism”, provoke an Islamic revival. Examples of this phenomenon may be found in Egypt, Syria and Iran. In Jordan, on the other hand, the non-ideological nature of the regime precluded the formation of an Islamic opposition (see, Moaddel 2002a). Instead, the Islamist movement in Jordan has been a force in democratic expansion (Robinson 1997). Despite the success of representative democracy in Jordan, women are under-represented there as in most other Arab countries (Faqir 2001).

Resurgence theory

Resurgence theory borrows aspects from both crisis theories and state culture theories. The theory takes at its starting point that the Islamic revival is foremost a reaction to the failure of modernisation in Middle East countries (Milton-Edwards 1996a: p. 4ff). The starting point is the colonial era which created a number of artificial nation states whose leaders embraced Western-oriented secular ideologies and pan-Arabism to forge a national identity and legitimize their grip on power. The defeat of Arab forces by Israel in 1967 led to a widespread identity crisis that made the masses turn away from the secular nation-state and embrace Islam as a vehicle towards spiritual renewal and a revival of the Islamic state. Discussing the relevance of this theory to the Palestinian case, MiltonEdwards finds that rather than linked to the chain of events after 1967, it was a result of traits inherent in the Palestinian situation itself that served as a catalyst for political Islam, mainly after 1982 when the PLO was defeated in Lebanon. The radicalisation within Palestine was in large part spurred by Israeli policies meant to suppress and eradicate the nationalist movements, but was neither defeatist nor the result of an identity crisis (ibid.).

Discursive theories

Moving away from social processes, an alternative way to approach the study of Islamic revival is through the symbolic role of religion. This approach is premised on Clifford Geertz’s (1973) definition of religion as “cultural system”, and on the powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism. In this approach, Islamic texts and doctrine become secondary to the main question, which is how Islam is played out in the daily lives of Muslims, especially how Islam is used as a vehicle for political mobilisation (Moaddel 2002b: p. 375). Important figures within this tradition, Eickelman and Piscatori, point to two processes that shape Muslim politics. The first is objectification, which means that Islam is no longer simply practised, but questioned by its practitioners. The second process is fragmentation, meaning that the clergy (ulama) are no longer the sole interpreters of Islamic doctrine, but challenged by a mixed breed of professionals (doctors, lawyers etc.) who likewise seek intellectual control of Islam. In themselves, however, these processes cannot alone account for the rise of Islamic activism (ibid.: p. 376). The symbolic approach to the study of religion was borne out of a conviction that Islam
was about humans and not religious dogma. This served to legitimise most anthropologists’ ignorance of scripturalist Islam (Lindholm 2002). This ignorance was also based on a pragmatic division of labour between the different disciplines: the Orientalists’ textual exegeses and Quran studies were complemented by anthropologists’ focus on Islamic symbols and popular belief.

While anthropologists now show a greater concern for history and scripturalist Islam (Lindholm 1999), the importance of the scripturalist as opposed to popular interpretations persists, as well as the tension between Muslim dogma and political life (Lindholm 1995: p. 815). Still, most of the studies undertaken by anthropologists in the Middle East tend to focus on key disciplinary issues such as tribalism (Gellner 1969), feudalism (Gilsenan 1996) and honour (Abu-Lughod 1986) rather than targeting Islam and its adherents as such (but see, Donnan 2002, Gilsenan 1990a). In general, anthropological accounts have been validated by the importance of orthopraxy (correct conduct) rather than orthodoxy (correct beliefs) in the Islamic faith and Muslim religious worship (Lindholm 2002: p. 113).

[Religion is: “A system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz 1973)]

Textual theories

Unlike the discursive theories outlined above, the textual theories seek find the answer to the growth of political Islam in religion itself (orthodoxy), that is the founding religious texts (Quran) and traditions of the Prophet (Sunna, Hadith). Often identified simply as Islamic studies, this approach has been boosted in the current “post 9/11” climate: there is a general tendency in academia to revert to scripturalist scholarship and textual exegesis as a means of uncovering the hidden meaning of the Islamic revival and the roots of the fundamentalist revolt (see, Lewis 2002). Among scholars engaged in textual analysis there is currently no consensus as to whether Islamic texts are compatible with “an ideal typical conception of rationalisation and political modernisation” (Moaddel 2002b: p. 380). In order to advance textual studies of Islam, Moaddel argues for a broader approach that not only considers the Islamic texts in isolation, but compares them with those of other cultural traditions (e.g., Western tradition) as well as other literary genres (narrative, legends) found in the Arab world (ibid.).

Nonetheless, in order to move beyond mere “representations” of the Muslim world, Fred Halliday has advocated a middle ground between “textual” and “discursive” approaches in order to uncover the “real” Muslim world. Likewise, Michael Salla (1997) has advocated a convergence approach where political Islam is not seen as temporary aberration to be contained and eventually stamped out, but, on a theoretical level, as a much needed critique of the deficiencies of the Western liberal democratic paradigm, thereby allowing political Islam, as religious revival, to develop into a genuine political force.

Political Islam

The problem of understanding “political” Islam begins already at the level of definition: what is political Islam and hence how can it best be “defined”? Because of this problem, many authors dispense with a definition altogether, leaving it to the reader to infer the many meanings of political Islam. This is also reflected in the common practice of “prefixing” Islam to create a bewildering conceptual plurality, which, to name but a few, includes; radical Islam, militant Islam, extremist Islam, revolutionary Islam and fundamentalist Islam. This diversity points both to the many aspects believed to characterise political Islam, as well as to the problem of finding an appropriate term.

The shortest (and most encompassing) definition of political Islam is that it denotes “Islam used to a political end”. A general problem with the term political Islam is that it tends to imply “an illegitimate extension of the Islamic tradition outside of the properly religious domain it has historically occupied” (Hirschkind 1997: p. 12). Another problem with the term political Islam is that Islam fuses religion and politics (din wa dawla), which is not captured by the term political Islam. A final point is that there is a tendency to condemn all forms of social protest as illegitimate and conflating legitimate protest and the use of militancy and violence (ibid.).

As Kari Karamé (1996) points out, because of the many shortcomings of the term political Islam there is increasing resort to the term “Islamism” (and Islamists), which also conforms to the common Arabic reference to the Islamic movement (al-harak al-Islamiyya) and its adherents as Islamists (Islamiyyun). There is hence a shift from a more abstract approach to one that considers the broader goals of the Islamist movement and the Islamist awakening (al-sahwa al-Islamiyya). A wide range of movements may fall within this general category but according to Bjørn Olav Utvik (1993: p. 201) the Islamist movement can be delimited by the three following traits. First of all they refer to themselves as the Islamic movement, secondly they call for an Islamic state ruled in accordance with Sharia and finally they organise themselves for the purpose of achieving these goals.

A defining feature of Islamists is that they embrace the concept ijtehad, that is, independent reasoning and reinterpretation of the Quran and Islamic traditions and the need to reinterpret the Holy Scriptures and apply them to today’s world. In this sense
Islamism is a modernist project, although as Utvik (1993) has noted, Islamists tend to embrace modernity (technological advances, industrialism etc) but reject modernism and its concomitant strong belief in science and reason. As Khan (2001) shows, the Islamist “project” is premised on three interrelated forms of critique: of modernity, of the west and of the state. More importantly, the current Islamist movement finds that although Islam is a “complete system” it is not a ready-made blueprint for a modern Islamic society. Thus the have adopted a reconstitutive dimension based on reinterpreting the sacred texts (ijtehad) and a programmatic dimension that seeks to translate key Islamic concepts into practical policy. There is, Khan argues, a general move towards more democratic means among those he labels “second-generation Islamists”. Example of this democratic shift can be found among the Islamist parties (Turkey’s Welfare Party) and olitical-cum-religious leaders (Iran’s president Muhammad Khatemi).

In general, the democratic transformation of political Islam, by some termed the “New Islamism” (Langohr 2001: p. 593), is still inadequately understood and as yet little studied (see CONCLUSION). Views are divided as to whether this is caused by an ideological shift, or whether the lessons of the past decade have taught them that overthrowing secular governments is impossible and that this approach has weakened the movements and robbed them of their leaders. This also ties in with the important question of whether political Islam is now a spent force or capable of continued growth. The charismatic period of political Islam can be placed around 1970–82 and the high point of the period was the revolution in Iran (1977–78) with Ayatollah Khomeini as the charismatic and messianic leader. As Sami Zubaida has argued, the Islamic movements have since their heyday in the 1970s become routinised.

and integrated into regular politics (Zubaida 2000). When the charismatic period came to an end, political Islam was gradually stripped of its political stamp to be replaced by conservative moralism. It was this transformation that prompted Olivier Roy’s claim to The Failure of Political Islam (1994). A similar argument has been advanced by Gilles Kepel (2002), who claims that the Islamist movement went through a first phase of expansion (c. 1966–89) that was followed by a decade of decline (1990–present). It may be invoked against Kepel’s analysis that he applies a very narrow definition of what may be considered proof of Islamism succeeding, namely that the Islamists have been brought to power through popular vote or by force. It seems that this criterion may prevent us from seeing the many ways in which political Islam manifests itself in the contemporary world. In an attempt to clarify the ideological basis of Islamic movements, Sami Zubaida (2000) has suggested a tripartite typology that includes conservative, radical and political Islam. Zubaida argues that conservative Islam primarily seeks moral and social control of its citizens. The foremost representative of this type is the Gulf States, in particular Saudi Arabia. The second type is best exemplified by the Egyptian Islamic groups building on the ideology of Sayyid Qutb that seek to overthrow unjust rulers. The third type, political Islam, differs from the two others by seeking to reform society and politics and representing a continuity with nationalist and leftist agendas.

In a twist on the old Orientalist debate (Said 1978), Sabet (2000: p. 897) argues that much of the scholarly work on political Islam is written within the confines of Western social theory and has to obey what he terms its “discursive parameters”. As an example of this problem Sabet includes the tendency to fix the label fundamentalist” to any regime that seeks to apply the Sharia in accordance with Islam. The implication is that religion should be separated from politics as in Western participatory democracy. The implied assumption is that fundamentalism’s (or political Islam’s) unitary approach to religion and state (din wa dawla) is suspect and opposed to Islam simply as a moral system separated from the state (din wa dunya). This argument is sometimes extended to the bigoted conclusion that there are “good Muslims” and “bad Muslims” (Mamdani 2002), something that may account for the current rise in what Halliday (1999) has termed “anti-Muslimism” in the West.

Jihad

An understanding of the concept of jihad is vital to understanding the ideological legitimisation of political Islam. The concept has a complex and contested history (evident in Quran and the Hadith), which reflects that it was interpreted according to changing socio-political circumstances (Euben 2002: p. 21). This made the true meaning of the term ambiguous. Nonetheless, there is a tendency to reify jihad, making it synonymous with armed struggle (“holy war”). This has caused it to become perhaps the most used (and abused) term in the political Islam vocabulary (see, Knudsen 2002a: p. 12). Thus, the term is now often used as a conventional shorthand not only for the Islamic revival in the Middle East (considered a “jihadist backlash”), but also for the alleged threat this represents to Western democracies in Islam’s quest for world hegemony (“global jihad”). While the notion of a “global jihad” can easily be discounted, a more difficult question is whether the Islamist movement is premised on an armed (“jehadist”) struggle against opponents and enemies.

The importance of jihad to the Islamist movement can be traced to the radical ideas of Sayyid Qutb and the radicalisation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1960s (see INTRODUCTION). The revolutionary ideology of Sayyid Qutb tied the concept to the struggle to overcome jahiliyya, a Quranic term which refers to the pre-Islamic condition combining ignorance and savagery. Qutb and the Islamists following in his footsteps argued that current Muslim societies had reverted to jahiliyya (Roy 1994: p. 41), a social condition (rather than an epoch or period) that must be defeated through a jihad in order to re-establish divine rule (hakimiyya). The importance of this becomes evident when considering that by redefining jihad from a defensive war against foreign unbelievers to an internal quest deposing un-Islamic governments and tyrants, Qutb had redefined jihad from an external fight against Islam’s enemies to an internal quest for control of the state. As Khan (2001: p. 221) points out, this gave the Islamists a “powerful moral weapon: the modern jihad, the just rebellion”. This explains two features of Islamism: although antiiWestern it is not primarily concerned with attacking the West. Rather, anti-Western sentiments are to a large degree channelled towards the autocratic regimes in the Middle East and also explain why they have made efforts to stamp out, co-opt or accommodate the Islamist movements (see, Moustafa 2000, Zeghal 1999, on Egypt). In general, any study of the growth of political Islam needs to consider the role of the state. Two aspects of the Middle East states stand out: first, the prevalence of autocratic regimes which has spurred the growth of political Islam; and second, the failure of secularism and pan-Arab nationalism which has caused an Islamist backlash (see THEORIES).

[It is worth noting that (to some) jahilyyia implies that members of society were no longer considered Muslims but termed takfir (impious). Excommunicated, they could legitimately be killed (Kepel 2002: p. 31)]

Democracy

The relationship between Islam and democracy is a complex one. Especially, there is disagreement over whether the Islamist movement is committed to democracy or inherently illiberal and undemocratic. As Vicky Langohr (2001: p. 591) notes, those who are sceptical about the possibility of a democratic Islamism generally advance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamists have seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosen this method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones. The second argument is that Islamists seek to impose Sharia, but considering that Sharia itself is discriminatory (against women, non-Muslims etc.) it follows that Islamists will seek to impose undemocratic policies.

The failure of liberal democracy in most of the Arab world has been attributed to Islam’s inadequate conception of individual rights (Moaddel 2002b). One the one hand it is argued that the lack of individual rights causes a lack of legislative functions that in turn explains the dearth of legislative institutions. This, in the final instance, explains why there is no need for any principle of (public) participation. The second explanation links this to the Islamic view of personhood where, it is argued, Islam is based on a positive view of the person who only needs proper guidance (By contrast Christianity is based on the concept of man as an evil sinner who must be controlled.) In classical Islamic political theory, such guidance is provided by the rightful caliph. After he is installed, following him is a Muslim duty (ibid.: p. 365). However, against this view it might be argued that there is another side to Islamic political theory which stresses the duty to depose a tyrannical leader as well as contains the conceptual elements of democracy (ibid.). They include the consultative assemblies or bodies (shura), consensus (ijma) and utility (masliha). The problem, as Moaddel sees it, is not the lack of democratic theory, but the lack of procedural rules in Islam that could be used to determine when installing or rebelling against a ruler is justified and when consensus can be used to settle a disputed matter of jurisprudence (ibid.).

In general, there is considerable scepticism as to whether Islamists are committed to democracy. The historian Elie Kedouri has even claimed that “democracy is alien to the mind-set of Islam” (cited in, Anderson 2001). The same goes for the question of popular vote, where some claim that Islamists only believe in “one man, one vote, one time” (Langohr 2001: 591). However, there are many examples that prove the opposite, in particular the recent Turkish Welfare party experience and leading Islamists claiming that Islamisation is best achieved through democratisation (Khan 2001: p. 223)

[A detailed discussion of Sharia and the state in the Modern Middle east can be found in, (Brown, 1997)}

Most of the Middle Eastern states are run by autocratic regimes bent on keeping Islamists from gaining power, both through denying them a popular vote and by brutal suppression of their leaders and followers. To many analysts, it is exactly the prevalence of autocracy in the Middle East that has given rise to Islamist movements, which are seen as a way of expressing popular sentiment against illegitimate rulers. The countries in the Middle East have pursued different strategies vis-à-vis the Islamist threat. They have either tried their best to suppress them periodically as in Egypt (Alterman 2000) or permanently (as in many Gulf states) or tried to prevent them from gaining power through participation in the popular vote. As Vicky Langohr (2001: p. 592) notes, “what is actually on offer to most Islamist movements, as well as other opposition movements, is participation in electoral contests for political office within regimes that remain highly authoritarian”. Still, the reasons for embracing democratic elections among Islamist movements vary from country to country. Islamic organisations such as the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and the Welfare Party (Refah or RP) in Turkey all “accept a pluralist political system and an electoral path to power” (Al Sayyid 2002: p. 178).

While these organisations have always sought political power using peaceful methods, only rarely are Islamist organisations transformed from violent to non-violent ones. An especially interesting case in this regard is the gradual pacification of the Lebanese Hizbollah, long a leading (Shia) Islamist group that became infamous for its violent guerrilla tactics that included the abduction of Western hostages, suicide missions and bomb attacks against foreign missions, most notably the attacks on the US embassy (63 persons killed) and US Marine barracks (241 killed) in Beirut in 1983 (see POLITICAL VIOLENCE). As Anthony Shadid (2002) explains it, one of the reasons for Hizbollah’s renunciation of political violence is a pragmatic concern with the high costs associated with the use of violence and, as developed over many years, that more could be achieved through the ballot box.

Following the peace accord in 1989 (Ta’if Agreement) that ended 15 years of civil war (1975–90), Hizbollah participated in two consecutive parliamentary elections (1992 and 1996) and won eight and seven seats respectively out of 128 parliamentary seats.
Although this was a mere symbolic representation in the Lebanese parliament, Hizbollah remained committed to Lebanon’s consociational democracy. Hizbollah in particular had developed a large network of social services that in many instances eclipsed those of the Lebanese state (Langohr 2001: p. 597). This provides the rganisation with a solid platform that it can rely on in municipal elections. As Nizar Hamzeh (2000) shows in his detailed article on the municipal elections in Lebanon in 1998, Hizbollah succeeded in winning the majority of Lebanon’s municipalities either through “party lists” made up of its own candidates or through the formation of “coalition lists” in a strategic alliance with independent candidates, secular and confessional parties (Sunni, Christian) as well as influential families (ibid.: p. 745ff). Overall, the main reason for Hizbollah’s stunning victory was its commitment to grassroots work and providing social welfare services to reduce poverty. The organisation runs three hospitals and more than 17 medical centres in addition to a large commercial network consisting of shopping malls, petrol stations and construction companies (ibid.: p. 743). Partly for this reason, Hizbollah is able to command a large section of the popular vote in local elections. Hezbollah’s election victory is also the result of having developed a professional campaign committee with a large salaried staff and hundreds of volunteers that ran pre-election trials and transported voters to the voting stations. A final reason for Hizbollah’s political dominance is that in the rural areas of Lebanon the central government remains weak, thus allowing Hizbollah to take over state functions, including the settlement of conflicts and meting out punishment (Hamzeh 1994). Taken together, these elements are important reasons for the scale of Hizbollah’s electoral victory in municipal elections. It is important to keep in mind, though, that despite the “gradualist-pragmatic formula” that Hizbollah has adopted (ibid.: p. 741), the organisation remains firmly committed to creating an Islamic state in Lebanon (Langohr 2001: p. 598). This is especially poignant since Lebanon is still struggling to overcome years of civil war that have caused political instability (Haddad 2002), economic turmoil (Norton 1999) and lingering tensions between the country’s multiple confessional identities (Barak 2002, Johnson 2001).

The pragmatism of Lebanon’s Hizbollah becomes even more interesting when compared with another Islamist group infamous for its use of extreme violence, namely the Palestinian Hamas (see POLITICAL VIOLENCE). Like Hizbollah, Hamas is a key provider of social welfare in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and protecting this welfare network is so important that the organisation tailors its violent tactics to prevent a backlash from the Israeli forces or the Palestinian Authority aimed at destroying or disrupting the welfare system itself (Mishal and Sela 2000). Likewise, Hamas’ covert participation in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 1996 was a calculated decision aimed at avoiding conferring credibility on the Oslo Accords (and the Declaration of Principles, DOP) while at the same time securing a future role in the subsequent municipal elections. A classified Hamas document from 1992 shows that the organisation initially considered four possible options: participation, boycott, boycott as well as undermine and disrupt elections, and participation under a name other than Hamas (Mishal and Sela 2000: p. 124). During the coming years the Hamas leadership softened its initial decision to boycott the elections and ask its supporters to refrain from casting their vote, to one of “refraining from participation” in the 1996 elections to the Palestinian Authority Council. At the same time, the organisation tacitly encouraged its members to run as independents and for the rank-and-file to vote for these candidates as well as Fatah candidates known for their good relations with the Islamic opposition. Exit polls found that an estimated 60 to 70 per cent of the Hamas supporters participated in the elections (ibid.: p. 136). By unofficially participating in the council elections, Hamas was able to exercise its influence without comprising its principled stand against the DOP, the opposition to the PA leadership and the prospects of Israeli domination of the elections. This strategy was also borne out by the fact that only those registering their vote in the PA elections were allowed to vote in the subsequent municipal elections, which Hamas not only contested but expected to win (Langohr 2001: p. 596).

[In general, Islamist parties have fared badly in popular elections and referendums (Appendix II).]

However, there are important exceptions to this general trend. The first country where the Islamists came to power through electoral processes was Algeria (Vandervalle 1997). After gaining independence from France in 1962, Algeria remained under quasi-military one-party rule that ended in the late 1980s due to a widening economic crisis that eventually lead to widespread demonstrations against the government in October 1988. This prompted a process of emocratisation that began in 1989 with a national referendum opened up to multi-party elections. The municipal and provincial elections proved a humiliating defeat for the socialists and a stunning victory for the Islamist party Front Islamique de Salut (FIS). The unexpected victory gave FIS control of most of Algeria’s local authorities (Milton-Edwards 2000: p. 169). Two years later, in 1991, the first round of elections to the national assembly was held. FIS, again, took a stunning lead, almost wiping out the more than 49 other parties contesting the election. Algeria was now within inches from having the “first democratic accession to power by a militant or fundamentalist party” (ibid.). Under growing pressure to suspend the second round of elections the government imposed a state of emergency in February 1992 and arrested the FIS leadership. In the coming years this gave rise to an Islamist insurgency that over time developed into a virtual civil war (see POLITICAL VIOLENCE).

In general, many analysts are sceptic of the prospects for developing Arab democracies (see, Anderson 2001). A special problem of participatory democracy is that many Arab states, in particular those labelled “rentier states,” are based not on public participation but on abstention from public from political participation. Awash with oil revenues, they tend not to tax their citizens, who are provided public benefits (or goods) free of charge. The principle “no taxation, no representation” means that the state is not constrained by the interests of its populace (Moaddel 2002b: p. 376). This fact may explain why democracy in Arab countries reverses prevailing theories (that there is a positive correlation between income and democracy): it is the poorer, not the richer, Arab countries which have taken steps towards democracy (Sadiki 2000: p. 88).

This may help explain why foreign aid has done little to promote democracy in the region (Carapico 2002): the United States alone has for the past decade spent more that US$ 250 million on democracy programmes with little impact (Ottaway et al. 2002: p. 7). This also ties in with the findings of Regan and Henderson (2002), who show that states with intermediate levels of democracy (semidemocracies) have the highest levels of political repression. A Middle East country that fits this general description is Egypt (Alterman 2000). These examples should not, however, be construed as proof that Islam and democracy are mutually exclusive (Midlarsky 1998).

Instead, it is worth remembering that while the evidence as to whether Islamists are committed to democracy are (as yet) inconclusive, there is ample evidence that most secular regimes in the Middle East are not (Langohr 2001: p. 608).

Political violence

The growth of extreme political violence in the Middle East is often attributed to the tendency to suppress democratic expression and freedom of speech. The use of extreme violence is often considered a defining feature of the Islamist movement in general, whereas in actual fact, it remains an aberration. The level of political violence naturally depends on how it is defined, and especially how to separate terrorism from acceptable political violence (the concept of just war, in Islam and in Christianity). At present, a normative problem is that there is no readily accepted definition of terrorism.

This problem becomes especially acute when violence targets innocent victims and bystanders. An example of this problem is a recent report by the Human Rights Watch, which caused an uproar because it concluded that the Palestinian suicide bombers belonging to the armed wing of Hamas (the Qassam Brigades) were systematically targeting civilians, and therefore committing war crimes (HRW 2002). A review of the reasons why terrorism occurs shows that they can be grouped into the following broad categories: psychological explanations (pathology, deprivation), societal explanations (economy, governance) and state explanations (sponsorship, hegemony, failed states) (Lia and Skjølberg 2000). It might seem that the most common explanations of so-called “Islamic terrorism” (in itself a misnomer) often combine these three explanations. In short, it is argued fundamentalist beliefs make adherents psychologically predisposed to use violence and surrender their lives (Taylor and Horgan 2001), that abysmal social conditions and frustration promote extremism (Andoni 1997), and that authoritarianism and secularism as well as political persecution have spurred a violent backlash from Islamist movements. We find here a contradiction between explanations which consider the use of violence a result of internalizing Islamist beliefs and those that locate them in the externalizing socio-political conditions (Langohr 2001: p. 591): The question of whether to resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherent in the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate to implement shari‘a ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent (that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven them to arms, best expressed by François Burgat’s contention that any Western political party could be turned in to the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if subjected to the same repression and Islamists had endured) looms large in this debate.

[A standard definition of (insurgent) terrorism is: “the deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence against instrumental (human) targets (C) in a conflict between two (A, B) or more parties, whereby the immediate victims C – who might not even be part of the conflicting parties – cannot, through change of attitude of behaviour, dissociate themselves from the conflict” (Schmid and Graaf 1982: p. 15).]

Nonetheless, there is often a general assumption that fundamentalist beliefs predispose a person to violence (act violently, seek violent means). It has been claimed that Islam is based on a “binary world view” where the “Land of Islam” (Dar al-Islam) is contrasted with “The Land of War” (Dar al-Harb) or the “Land of Unbelief” (Dar al-Kufr). In important ways, it is argued, this particular world view predisposes Islam and believers of the faith to defeat the latter in order to promote the former (Lia and Kjøk 2001: p. 14). It has long been acknowledged that a defining feature of terrorist attacks and other forms of extreme violence is that the ultimate purpose is not the carnage itself, but the communicative message this conveys to a set of spectators (local and trans-local) (Schmid and Graaf 1982). More concretely, it may be delineated as a transmitter (the terrorist), the intended recipient (target), message (bombing, ambush) and feedback (response of target) (see, Lia and Skjølberg 2000). There is, hence, what may be termed “the triangle of violence”, which includes the relationships between performers, victims and witnesses. In conventional (military) combat, the opposing armies do everything in their power to limit the number of casualties, often resorting to high-tech wizardry to limit loss of life. In suicide missions the opposite applies: there is a 100 percent willingness to sacrifice one’s life and the attacks are technologically simple (ibid.: p. 24). A typical example is a single person (male or female) setting off a home-made bomb strapped around the body in a crowd of innocent bystanders.

An important reason why such attacks are not condemned is that from an Islamic perspective, the terms “suicide missions” and “suicide bombers” are inappropriate. Islam forbids suicide (intihar), therefore the perpetrator is considered to have been a martyr (mujahid, shahid) who will embrace martyrdom (shahadah) (Euben 2002: p. 28). Etymologically the term mujahadid is related to the jihad, hence the act of sacrifice needs to be understood within the context of jihad itself. We can illustrate this by considering how jihad was interpreted by Palestinian Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which are perhaps the most prominent perpetrators of extreme political violence. Hamas was formed in 1987 in the wake of the Palestinian uprising (intifadah) as an outgrowth of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (Abu-Amr 1993: p. 10). Hamas was an ideological heir to the so-called Mujamma movement led by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, whose main concern was Islamic preaching (da’wa) and teaching (tarbiya) in the Gaza strip. The movement had been involved in sporadic violence, but then only against fellow Palestinians.

In an excellent article detailing the shift in Hamas’ strategy from 1988, Beverley Milton-Edwards (1992) shows how the Palestinian uprising made Hamas popularise the notion of jihad. The details of Hamas’ new strategy were laid out in the Hamas Covenant issued in 1988, which is the organisation’s main ideological document
(Hamas 1988). The covenant underlines the importance of jihad, but, importantly, delimits the concept by applying it to ending the Israeli occupation of Palestine. According to the charter, there is no solution to Palestine problems except through jihad, and Article 15 in the covenant reads: “When an enemy occupies some of the Muslim lands, jihad becomes obligatory on every Muslim” (ibid.).

As Milton-Edwards shows, Hamas therefore applied jihad differently from the competing Palestinian Islamist movement, the Islamic Jihad. Although the goals of the two organisations overlap, Islamic Jihad tends towards a more universal application of jihad, including restoration of the Caliphate in all Muslim countries (ibid.). Hamas, on the other hand, shied away from an encompassing definition of jihad, restricting the term to opposition against Israel. Nonetheless, detailed studies of Hamas and its militant wing show that violence is used pragmatically, more often than not, in the form of calculated titfor-tat retaliation against Israeli forces and more recently, civilians. According to the leaders of Hamas, “they are legitimately waging a jihad against foreign occupation” (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2001: 50). The Hamas leaders are not alone in defending the use of extreme violence. The Egyptian cleric Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, current in exile in Qatar, has argued that suicide bombings are fully in accord with Islamic teachings and represent “the most exalted form of martyrdom” (cited in, El-Affendi n.d.). Although this clearly is a minority view that is also opposed by reputed clerics such as the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar (Muhammad Hussein Tanawi), the popular support for Palestinian suicide missions is strong in all the Arab countries. In April 2002 the Saudi Ambassador in London, Ghazi al-Qusaibi, created a stir when he published a poem in a London-based Arabic newspaper which paid tribute to Palestinian suicide bombers as dying “to honor
God’s word” (MEMRI 2002). In particular, Al-Qusaibi hailed the teenager Ayat Akhras, a quiet schoolgirl, who detonated explosives strapped to her body at a Jerusalem supermarket, killing two Israelis and injuring twenty-five (in March 2001). The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a militant group allied with Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement, said it was responsible for sending Ayat to kill herself.

The willingness to use extreme violence is something that many, including those sympathetic to the goals of the organisation and the plight of the Palestinians, find unacceptable. Overall, the field known as “terrorism studies” tends see violence perpetrated by Islamist radicals as a special type that has been branded the “new terrorism” (Lia and Kjøk 2001: p. 8). They are set apart from ordinary terrorists by their personality, rationality and organisation. They are portrayed as more violent than “secular terrorists”, the attacks are considered irrational, that is, defying rational cost-benefit calculations, and the attackers belong to closed circles led by a spiritual leader and linked to other groups of similar persuasion through informal networks (ibid.: p. 8). On closer inspection, however, the first two assumptions appear questionable when compared with available data. For example, the case given above (Ayat Akhras) defies the claim to a terrorist personality. She had no previous history of violence abuse, she was not a member of any Islamist organisation – in fact two organisations refused her plea for help to carry our her mission – until she finally persuaded the Al-Aqsa Brigades to assist her. The second assertion, that “Islamic terrorism” defies cost-benefit calculations, also appears wrong. For example, if we look at the attacks carried out by the two best known Palestinian Islamist groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, they are neither indiscriminate nor irrational but rather carefully planned and executed. As Kydd and Walter demonstrate, terrorist attacks in the Middle East “show a clear and recurring pattern where violence is timed to coincide with major events in the peace process” (2002: p. 263-264). Examining the period 1988–98, Kydd and Walter find that the use of extreme violence reduces the likelihood that peace agreements will be successful. Especially where the parties to the conflict do not trust each other (as in the Israel-Palestine conflict) terrorist attacks are very likely to derail a nascent peace process (ibid: p. 289).

Although, terrorist activity is “patterned” it is not easily predictable, and there is no standard distribution curve (“non-Gaussian curve distribution”); therefore it is difficult to predict when terrorist strikes might occur (Cordesman 2000). This makes preventing terrorist attacks costly and more so because of unregulated money transmissions have made “terrorist finance” very hard to control (Winer and Roule 2002). This may also be linked with a common characteristic of groups involved in extreme violence (religious or secular), that the organisation is loosely structured around a number of independent “cells” that may span several countries, something making them hard to target. In some cases these cells may be considered nodes in a terrorist network that enables them to carry out coordinated attacks requiring
specialist training, informal financing and complex strategic planning. The most prominent organisation of this type is the Al Qaeda (Simon 2002), but sensationalist reportage of the organisation and its leader Osama bin Laden conveniently forgets that most Arab countries and Muslims reject the organisation’s methods and agenda (Al Sayyid 2002). Furthermore, it is worth noting that most militant Islamic groups in the Arab world are not international in scope but dependent on local sources of support, especially money and weapons (Khashan 1997).

Still, the use of violence, and especially extreme violence, varies among Islamist groups. The group often cited as being the most violent is the Algerian “Armed Islamic Group” (Groupe Islamique Armée), better know under its acronym “GIA”. Founded in 1989, it emerged as the leading insurgent organisation, which unlike the rival Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) (see DEMOCRACY), condemned the elections and refused to cooperate with the Algerian regime. Since the elections were suspended in 1991, Algeria has been seized by a wave of violence. Between 1992 and 1998 the country was thrown into a virtual civil war that pitched the military-backed regime against a complex, clandestine opposition derived from the country’s banned Islamist movement, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). Official figures put the number of people killed during this period at 100,000, that is about 1,200 deaths per month (CrisisWeb Online). In mid-1997, the armed wing of FIS, the Army of Islamic Salvation (AIS), declared a unilateral cease-fire (Gerges 1999). AIS even collaborated with the Algerian regime in its fight against GIA. Currently most analysts agree that GIA is no longer capable of destabilising the regime and has alienated itself from ordinary Algerians (see, Lia and Kjøk 2001).

Appendix I: Persons met:

Abdelwahab el-Affendi - Centre for the Study of Democracy: London
Farhan Nizami - Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies: Oxford
Mohammed Talib - Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies: Oxford
Robert Spingborg - London Middle East Institute at SOAS: London
Zami Zubaida - Birkbeck College, University of London: London
Emad S. Shahin - American University of Cairo Cairo
Mustapha Al-Sayyid American University of Cairo: Cairo
Amr Hamzawi - American University of Cairo: Cairo
Dia’a Rashwan - Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies: Cairo
Muhammad A. Khalidi - American University of Beirut: Beirut
Ahmad Mousalli - American University of Beirut: Beirut

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