The Four Imaams: Leaders in Tolerance

The Four Imams: Leaders of a Third Way instead of “You are either with us or against us.”

Sheikh Salmaan al-'Awdah
Tue, 03/29/2011

If we look back on the lives of the four imams – Abu Hanifah, Malik b. Anas, al-Shafi`i, and Ahmad b. Hanbal – we find that they were extremely tolerant people. They were respectful of their contemporaries, predecessors and the earlier generations of Muslims, whether they agreed with their views or not. Indeed, they followed the example of their predecessors in being tolerant of differences.

Allah says: “And those who came (into the faith) after them say: Our Lord! Forgive us and our brethren who were before us in the faith, and place not in our hearts any rancour toward those who believe. Our Lord! You are full of kindness, most merciful.” [Surah al-Hashr: 10]

The four imams -- the leading scholars who founded the four canonical schools of Islamic Law -- never allowed past disagreements to cause them to disparage or raise suspicions about the people of an earlier generation who held divergent views. Likewise, they never called for an inquest of their contemporaries who disagreed with them and they never got involved in their affairs except in a positive way.

The four imams certainly disagreed with one another and with other jurists of their day, but they always maintained their calm in debate and disagreed respectfully. They never permitted others who spread their ideas to use their teachings as a source of conflict or as a means to cause division.

It could possibly be that the principle they developed of coexistence in the face of changing political and social circumstances came as a result of their engaging with the substantial societal changes they witnessed during the era in which they lived. They recognized a need to develop a clear and precise approach to respond to such changes.

It can be observed that none of the four imams ever accepted an official political post, not as judge nor magistrate nor anything else. At the same time, they also never constituted themselves as a political opposition. They never gave their support to the government’s political opponents, even though all four imams times suffered government persecution on account of accusations that they did. However, a close examination of the imams’ historical circumstances shows that such accusations were baseless. Instead, they were victims of the old idea: “You are either with us or against us.”

Their insistence on intellectual autonomy is what brought such suspicion upon them, along with how unscrupulous people would sometimes manipulate their statements and interpret their juristic verdicts for various political ends.

In truth, the four imams represented a third way: neither aligning themselves with the interests of those in power nor with the political opposition. This allowed them to carry out a vital leadership role of their own in maintaining social stability in a society made up of a number of contending factions: between the ruling class and the populace, as well as between a bewildering array of ideological factions and intellectual movements, not to mention ethnic and tribal differences. After all this, we can understand how they were so good at tolerating the disagreements of their colleagues among the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence!

They all kept a measured distance from the various contending elements in society while remaining fully connected to society. This made it possible for them to be a point of stability and balance, which protected Islamic civilization from a great deal of conflict, strife, and social disintegration.

The role they played in their times is all the more needed today with our widening social and class disparity and a weakened culture of tolerance, conditions that promote conflict whenever conditions are ripe for it.

The presence of an autonomous knowledge-based mediating authority is needed to act as a a source of strength for the weak and a moderating influence on the strong, to arbitrate in matters, and to impart to society the vales of tolerance and mutual understanding. There is a need for those who can speak out for justice and the inalienable rights that are needed to ensure peace and security in any country, and which can prevent violent factions and extremist movements of whatever persuasion from developing.

The world contains nations where you find a strong government and an equally strong civil society. They are held together by organizing principles and their vital, political, social, and charitable institutions. This is what makes the government strong through its people and the people strong through their government.

Most Muslim countries do not enjoy this balancing of institutional power, essential for stability and continuity, which comes from the presence of mediating institutions that are widely recognized and accepted on both an official and popular level, institutions whose role is often only appreciated when their loss leads to the erosion of society.

Ideological and partisan disagreements, religious differences, and other potential sources of division do not inevitably lead to conflict and strife. Allah says in the Qur’an: “It is He who has spread out the Earth for all His creatures.” [Surah al-Rahman: 10]

Within the sphere Islam, matters are referred back to universal principles and the legitimate life needs that Islam upholds. When such a reference becomes impracticable due to the severity of the disagreement tor disparity of the parties involved and the matter cannot be brought to a resolution through dialogue, there still remains a broader circle for coexistence: the one of: “knowing one another” referred to in the verse: “O humankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that you may come to know one another.” [Surah al-Hujurat: 13]

This coming to know one another, this mutual and reciprocal knowledge of the other, is the foundation for social relationships necessitating goodwill, justice, and kindness.

It is possible that through such relationships you will realize your own best interests as well as those of the people you disagree with at one and the same time. We see this in so many aspects of life: commercial dealings, in public administration, health, development, and industry.

Returning to the four imams, it needs to be pointed out that the disagreements between them in Islamic Law were nothing compared to the disagreements that existed among the Companions and Successors. Moreover, they introduced through their own juristic efforts a number of opinions that were new to their generation. Therefore, it is wrong for anyone to claim that their views abrogate the views of their predecessors and exclude all views other than theirs.

The later scholars who worked within the framework of one of the four schools of law, though they did not usually go off in an entirely independent direction, never ceased to engage in choosing between different opinions and deducing new rulings on the basis of precedent. I have studied the legal preferences of the preeminent Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudamah, and found that he sometimes adopted a position that was at variance to what was adopted by all four schools of thought. He did so after acknowledging and discussing all of their received opinions His judgments in these cases are often quite erudite and impressive.

We can find similar cases among the jurists of all four schools of law. This is because the views of the Companions, Successors, and other jurists are no less important than the views of the four imams. They were also from the earliest Muslim generations and theirs is a rich and valuable legacy which has been preserved for us in works like the Musannaf of `Abd al-Razzaq, the Musannaf of Ibn Abi Shaybah, and the writings of Ibn Mundhir.

When we look at the magnitude of the changes taking place in the world today, we can appreciate the value of there being such a broad spectrum of opinion during the earliest days of Islam. Their contributions should not be ignored, since they enrich our understanding of Islamic Law. Though there may have been times in the history of Muslim civilization that such a plurality of opinion was unnecessary for society to function, our present age is certainly not one of those times.

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The School of Hadith vs. The School of Opinion

In the early development of Islamic Law, two broad schools developed, one was the “School of Hadith” exemplified by the early jurists of Western Arabia and later by Mālik, and then by al-Shāfiʿī and Ahmad b. Hanbal. The other was the “School of Opinion” exemplified by the early jurists of Iraq and later by Abū Hanīfah, Abū Yūsuf, and Muhammad al-Shaybānī.

Both schools recognized the authority of the Qur’an and Sunnah as the primary sources for Islamic teachings. They differed in how far personal opinion and juristic discretion could play a role in formulating Islamic Law. This led at times to bitter rivalry between the two schools, but this rivalry was overcome in a remarkable synthesis that left all the Islamic legal schools more robust than they were before. How did this happen?

The School of Hadith developed in the cradle of Islam, where the statements of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) were well preserved, society had changed little since the Prophet’s time, culture was more homogeneous, and there was far less confusion and political turbulence

The primary figure in the School of Opinion was Abū Hanīfah based in Kufah. He made the greatest contribution to this approach to Law. He was responding to the people’s needs in his locality where there were numerous new developments and a scarcity of reliable hadīth knowledge. This demanded an increased emphasis on original thinking and juristic analogy (qiyās).

This brought him a fair share of criticism from people who were less broadminded than him and those who did not have to cope with the same kinds of problems. However, once the school was firmly established and its principles were clearly outlined, many of its detractors were won over. Even those who were not convinced were willing to concede that it was a viable approach. The vitriol that the school used to invoke almost ceased being heard. When we look at history, we see that this is the case with most new ideas. The same resistance took place in other academic disciplines, like legal theory, and even grammar.

Moreover, we should not underestimate Abū Hanīfah’s regard for the Prophet’s hadith. Abū Hanīfah said: “Whatever reaches us from Allah’s Messenger we accept without reservation. What reaches us from the Companions, we choose from it and do not depart from their opinions. As for what reaches us from the Successors, they are men like us. As for anything else, no reproach should be heard about it.”

Al-Hasan b. Ziyād al-Lu’lu’ī relates that he heard Abū Hanīfah say: “When we assert an opinion and declare it as such, this means that it is the best we were able to determine about the matter. If anyone else comes along with a better opinion, then it is more appropriate to regard his opinion as correct.”

Yahyā b. Durays heard a man tell Sufyān al-Thawrī that Abū Hanīfah described his methodology to him as follows:
I take what I find in Allah’s Book. If I do not find anything there, then I refer to the Sunnah of Allah’s messenger. If I do not find anything in eutehr Allah’s Book or the Sunnah of Allah’s messenger, then I turn to the opinions of the Companions. I adopt from those opinions what I wish and leave aside what I wish, but I do not leave off their opinions altogether for the opinion of someone else. If I find nothing, or if I only have the opinions of (Successors) like Ibrāhīm, al-Sha`bī, Ibn Sīrīn, al-Hasan al-Basrī, `Atā’, and Sa`īd b. al-Musayyib, then these are counted as regular men. They exercised their best judgement, and I likewise do the same.
These, then, were the primary sources of law for Abū Hanīfah. He was quite clear about the fact that his principle sources were two: the Quran and Sunnah. We understand that he also accepted any opinion that the Companions were unanimously agreed upon, but when they differed, he adopted the opinion that he deemed best, but he never departed from their opinions altogether.

On the other hand, when all he had were the opinions of the Successors, he was as qualified as they were to exercise his judgement. One of the Successors he mentioned in his statement above was Ibrāhīm al-Nakha`ī who had been the teacher of his own teacher Hammād b. Abī Salamah.

Al-Hasan b. Sālih b. Hayy said: “Al-Nu`mān b. Thābit was erudite, discerning, and well-grounded in his knowledge. Once he ascertained the authenticity of a hadīth from the Prophet, he would not set it aside for anything else.”

This is what we have to assume about him and any other imam of his stature. They never disagreed about the Qur’an or about its clear meanings. They exercised their own judgement only in issues that required them to do so, where Allah has commanded us to do so. An inevitable consequence people exercising their judgement, of course, is a multiplicity of opinions. This is why `Umar b. `Abd al-`Azīz said: “I do not wish that the Prophet’s Companions had never disagreed. If that had been the case, there would be no leeway in the religion. They were leaders in faith for us to follow, and if a man adopts the opinion of any one of them, he is within his rights to do so.”

May Allah bless Ahmad b. Hanbal for saying: “We used to curse the ‘School of Opinion’ and they used to curse us, and this remained the way things were until al-Shāfi`ī came along and brought us together.”

Al-Qadī `Iyād explains Ahmad’s statement as follows:
He means that he used to adhere strictly to authentic textual narrations and use them exclusively. Then al-Shāfī`ī showed them that they needed to exercise their opinion through the use of juristic reasoning and adopt legal rulings on that basis. Using qiyās to make an analogy between a ruling established by textual evidence and an unprecedented case is actually a way to us the text and apply it to a new situation. He showed them how to determine the rationale behind the existing ruling and identify where it could be found in various new legal questions. In this way, the adherents of the school of hadīth learned that sound opinion is in the service of textual sources.

Likewise, he showed the School of Opinion that since the exercise of legal reasoning is dependent upon the textual basis, there can be no opinion without it. The Sunnah and authentic narrations have to be given precedence.
Ishāq al-Rāhawayh and others admitted that what Ahmad said had been the case for them as well, until they found themselves adopting Abū Hanīfah’s views on a number of issues. This is the way of fair-minded people. When the truth becomes clear to them, they admit it and adopt it without hesitation.

When al-Shāfi`ī wrote the first-ever work on legal theory, al-Risālah, laying out the principles and approaches to legal reasoning and sound deduction, he cleared up a lot of confusion for everybody. He also put to rest a lot of the hostility and bickering that was taking place between the many and diverse legal schools which existed at the time.

The plurality of schools – which had arisen in various parts of the Muslim world like Western Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Morocco, and Transoxiana – was a good thing in and of itself, making Islamic law more vigorous, responsive, and comprehensive.

Circumstances varied in different parts of the Muslim world. Some areas were affluent while others were poor. Some were politically strong while others were weak. Some were cosmopolitan centres of knowledge while others were provincial and insular. Factors like these had an unmistakable affect on the thinking of the jurists who lived in those areas. They had to face different kinds of problems and had to address those problems within differing social contexts. as the Caliph `Umar b. `Abd al-`Azīz astutely observed: “People have problems and issues to the extent that they engage in wrongful activities.”

http://en.islamtoday.net/artshow-416-4671.htm