World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity

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The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity

POLL August 9, 2012

The world’s 1.6 billion Muslims are united in their belief in God and the Prophet Muhammad and are bound together by such religious practices as fasting during the holy month of Ramadan and almsgiving to assist people in need. But they have widely differing views about many other aspects of their faith, including how important religion is to their lives, who counts as a Muslim and what practices are acceptable in Islam, according to a worldwide survey by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life.

The survey, which involved more than 38,000 face-to-face interviews in over 80 languages, finds that in addition to the widespread conviction that there is only one God and that Muhammad is His Prophet, large percentages of Muslims around the world share other articles of faith, including belief in angels, heaven, hell and fate (or predestination). While there is broad agreement on the core tenets of Islam, however, Muslims across the 39 countries and territories surveyed differ significantly in their levels of religious commitment, openness to multiple interpretations of their faith and acceptance of various sects and movements.

Some of these differences are apparent at a regional level. For example, at least eight-in-ten Muslims in every country surveyed in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and South Asia say that religion is very important in their lives. Across the Middle East and North Africa, roughly six-in-ten or more say the same. And in the United States, a 2011 Pew Research Center survey found that nearly seven-in-ten Muslims (69%) say religion is very important to them. (For more comparisons with U.S. Muslims, see Appendix A.) But religion plays a much less central role for some Muslims, particularly in nations that only recently have emerged from communism. No more than half of those surveyed in Russia, the Balkans and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia say religion is very important in their lives. The one exception across this broad swath of Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Central Asia is Turkey, which never came under communist rule; fully two-thirds of Turkish Muslims (67%) say religion is very important to them.

Generational differences are also apparent. Across the Middle East and North Africa, for example, Muslims 35 and older tend to place greater emphasis on religion and to exhibit higher levels of religious commitment than do Muslims between the ages of 18 and 34. In all seven countries surveyed in the region, older Muslims are more likely to report that they attend mosque, read the Quran (also spelled Koran) on a daily basis and pray multiple times each day. Outside of the Middle East and North Africa, the generational differences are not as sharp. And the survey finds that in one country – Russia – the general pattern is reversed and younger Muslims are significantly more observant than their elders. 

There are also differences in how male and female Muslims practice their faith. In most of the 39 countries surveyed, men are more likely than women to attend mosque. This is especially true in Central Asia and South Asia, where majorities of women in most of the countries surveyed say they never attend mosque. However, this disparity appears to result from cultural norms or local customs that constrain women from attending mosque, rather than from differences in the importance that Muslim women and men place on religion. In most countries surveyed, for example, women are about as likely as men to read (or listen to readings from) the Quran on a daily basis. And there are no consistent differences between men and women when it comes to the frequency of prayer or participation in annual rites, such as alms giving and fasting during Ramadan.

Sectarian Differences 

The survey asked Muslims whether they identify with various branches of Islam and about their attitudes toward other branches or subgroups. While these sectarian differences are important in some countries, the survey suggests that many Muslims around the world either do not know or do not care about them.

Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa tend to be most keenly aware of the distinction between the two main branches of Islam, Sunni and Shia.² (See text box for definitions.) In most countries surveyed in the region, at least 40% of Sunnis do not accept Shias as fellow Muslims. In many cases, even greater percentages do not believe that some practices common among Shias, such as visiting the shrines of saints, are acceptable as part of Islamic tradition. Only in Lebanon and Iraq – nations where sizable populations of Sunnis and Shias live side by side – do large majorities of Sunnis recognize Shias as fellow Muslims and accept their distinctive practices as part of Islam.

Outside of the Middle East and North Africa, the distinction between Sunni and Shia appears to be of lesser consequence. In many of the countries surveyed in Central Asia, for instance, most Muslims do not identify with either branch of Islam, saying instead that they are “just a Muslim.” A similar pattern prevails in Southern and Eastern Europe, where pluralities or majorities in all countries identify as “just a Muslim.” In some of these countries, decades of communist rule may have made sectarian distinctions unfamiliar. But identification as “just a Muslim” is also prevalent in many countries without a communist legacy. For example, in Indonesia, which has the world’s largest Muslim population, 26% of Muslims describe themselves as Sunnis, compared with 56% who say they are “just a Muslim” and 13% who do not give a definite response.

Opinion also varies as to whether Sufis – members of religious orders who emphasize the mystical dimensions of Islam – belong to the Islamic faith.³ In South Asia, Sufis are widely seen as Muslims, while in other regions they tend to be less well known or not widely accepted as part of the Islamic tradition. Views differ, too, with regard to certain practices traditionally associated with particular Sufi orders. For example, reciting poetry or singing in praise of God is generally accepted in most of the countries where the question was asked. But only in Turkey do a majority of Muslims believe that devotional dancing is an acceptable form of worship, likely reflecting the historical prominence of the Mevlevi or “whirling dervish” Sufi order in Turkey.

Differing Views on Orthodoxy 

The survey asked Muslims whether they believe there is only one true way to understand Islam’s teachings or if multiple interpretations are possible. In 32 of the 39 countries surveyed, half or more Muslims say there is only one correct way to understand the teachings of Islam.

This view, however, is far from universal. In the Middle East and North Africa, majorities or substantial minorities in most countries – including Tunisia, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Iraq – believe that it is possible to interpret Islam’s teachings in multiple ways. In sub-Saharan Africa, at least one-in-five Muslims agree. In South Asia, Southeast Asia and across Southern and Eastern Europe, at least one-in-six in every country surveyed believe Islam is open to multiple interpretations.

In some Central Asian countries, slightly fewer Muslims say their faith can be subject to more than one interpretation. But in Kazakhstan (31%), Turkey (22%) and Kyrgyzstan (17%), the percentage that holds this view is on par with countries in other regions.

In the United States, by contrast, 57% of Muslims say Islam is open to multiple interpretations. On this measure, Muslim Americans look similar to Muslims in Morocco and Tunisia. (For more comparisons with previous surveys of U.S. Muslims, see Appendix A.)

What is a Median?  

The median is the middle number in a list of numbers sorted from highest to lowest. On many questions in this report, medians are reported for groups of countries to help readers see regional patterns in religious beliefs and practices.

For a region with an odd number of countries, the median on a particular question is the middle spot among the countries surveyed in that region. For regions with an even number of countries, the median is computed as the average of the two countries at the middle of the list (e.g., where six nations are shown, the median is the average of the third and fourth countries listed in the region).

By contrast, figures reported for individual countries represent the total percentage for the category reported.

Core Beliefs 

Traditionally, Muslims adhere to several articles of faith. Among the most widely known are: there is only one God; God has sent numerous messengers, with Muhammad being His final Prophet; God has revealed Holy Scriptures, including the Quran; God’s angels exist, even if people cannot see them; there will be a Day of Judgment, when God will determine whether individuals are consigned to heaven or hell; and God’s will and knowledge are absolute, meaning that people are subject to fate or predestination.⁴ 

As previously noted, belief in one God and the Prophet Muhammad is nearly universal among Muslims in most countries surveyed. Although the survey asked only respondents in sub-Saharan Africa whether they consider the Quran to be the word of God, the findings in that region indicate broad assent.⁵Across most of the African nations surveyed, more than nine-in-ten Muslims say the Quran is the word of God, and solid majorities say it should be taken literally, word for word. Only in two countries in the region – Guinea Bissau (59%) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (54%) – do smaller percentages think the Quran should be read literally. The results in those two countries are similar to the United States, where 86% of Muslims said in a 2007 survey that the Quran was the word of God, including 50% who said it should be read literally, word for word. (For more U.S. results, see Appendix A.)

The survey asked respondents in all 39 countries whether they believe in the existence of angels. In Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East-North Africa region, belief in angels is nearly universal. In Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa more than seven-in-ten also say angels are real. Even in Southern and Eastern Europe,  a median of 55% share this view.

The expression “Inshallah” (“If God wills”) is a common figure of speech among Muslims and reflects the Islamic tradition that the destiny of individuals, and the world, is in the hands of God. And indeed, the survey finds that the concept of predestination, or fate, is widely accepted among Muslims in most parts of the world. In four of the five regions where the question was asked, medians of about nine-in-ten (88% to 93%) say they believe in fate, while a median of 57% express this view in Southern and Eastern Europe.

The survey also asked about the existence of heaven and hell. Across the six regions included in the study, a median of more than seven-in-ten Muslims say that paradise awaits those who have lived righteous lives, while a median of at least two-thirds say hell is the ultimate fate of those who do not live righteously and do not repent.

Unifying Rituals 

Along with the core beliefs discussed above, Islam is defined by “Five Pillars” – basic rituals that are obligatory for all members of the Islamic community who are physically able to perform them. The Five Pillars include: the profession of faith (shahadah); daily prayer (salat); fasting during the holy month of Ramadan (sawm); annual alms giving to assist the poor or needy (zakat); and participation in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca at least once during one’s lifetime (hajj). Two of these – fasting during Ramadan and alms giving – stand out as communal rituals that are especially widespread among Muslims across the globe.

Fasting during the month of Ramadan, which according to Islamic tradition is required of all healthy, adult Muslims, is part of an annual rite in which individuals place renewed emphasis on the teachings of the Quran. The survey finds that many Muslims in all six major geographical regions surveyed observe the month-long, daytime fast during Ramadan. In Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, medians of more than nine-in-ten say they fast annually (94%-99%). Many Muslims in Southern and Eastern Europe and in Central Asia also report fasting during Ramadan.

Annual alms giving, which by custom is supposed to equal approximately 2.5% of a person’s total wealth, is almost as widely observed as fasting during Ramadan. In Southeast Asia and South Asia, a median of roughly nine-in-ten Muslims (93% and 89%, respectively) say they perform zakat. At least three-quarters of respondents in the countries surveyed in the Middle East and North Africa (79%) and sub-Saharan Africa (77%) also report that they perform zakat. Smaller majorities in Central Asia (69%) and Southern and Eastern Europe (56%) say they practice annual alms giving.

One Faith, Different Levels of Commitment 

These common practices and shared beliefs help to explain why, to many Muslims, the principles of Islam seem both clear and universal. As mentioned above, half or more in most of the 39 countries surveyed agree that there is only one way to interpret the teachings of Islam.

But even though the idea of a single faith is widespread, the survey finds that Muslims differ significantly in their assessments of the importance of religion in their lives, as well as in their views about the forms of worship that should be accepted as part of the Islamic faith.

Central Asia along with Southern and Eastern Europe have relatively low levels of religious commitment, both in terms of the lower importance that Muslims in those regions place on religion and in terms of self-reported religious practices. With the exception of Turkey, where two-thirds of Muslims say religion is very important in their lives, half or fewer across these two regions say religion is personally very important to them. This includes Kazakhstan and Albania, where just 18% and 15%, respectively, say religion is central to their lives. (See "How Much Religion Matters" chart.)

Along with the lower percentages who say religion is very important in their lives, Muslims in Central Asia and across Southern and Eastern Europe also report lower levels of religious practice than Muslims in other regions. For instance, only in Azerbaijan does a majority (70%) pray more than once a day. Elsewhere in these two regions, the number of Muslims who say they pray several times a day ranges from slightly more than four-in-ten in Kosovo (43%), Turkey (43%) and Tajikistan (42%) to fewer than one-in-ten in Albania (7%) and Kazakhstan (4%).

In other regions included in the study, daily prayer is much more common among Muslims. In Southeast Asia, for example, at least three-quarters pray more than once a day, while in the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, majorities in most countries report the same.

Muslims in Central Asia, as well as in Southern and Eastern Europe, also tend to be less observant than their counterparts in other regions when it comes to mosque attendance. Just over four-in-ten Turkish Muslims (44%) say they visit their local mosque once a week or more, while three-in-ten do the same in Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the remaining countries, fewer than a quarter of Muslims say they go to worship services at least once a week.

By contrast, outside Central Asia and the Southern-Eastern Europe region, substantially larger percentages of Muslims say they attend mosque once a week or more, although only in sub-Saharan Africa do broad majorities in all countries display this high level of religious commitment.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that despite lower levels of religious commitment on some measures, majorities of Muslims across most of Central Asia and Southern and Eastern Europe nonetheless subscribe to core tenets of Islam, and many also report that they observe such pillars of the faith as fasting during Ramadan and annual almsgiving to the poor.

Generational Differences in Religious Commitment 

Of all the countries surveyed, only in Russia do Muslims ages 18-34 place significantly more importance on religion than Muslims 35 and older (48% vs. 41%). Younger Muslims in Russia also tend to pray more frequently (48% do so once a day or more, compared with 41% of older Muslims). 

Elsewhere in Southern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the older generation of Muslims generally places a greater emphasis on religion and engages more often in prayer. For example, Muslims ages 35 and older are more likely than younger Muslims to pray several times a day in Uzbekistan (+18 percentage points), Tajikistan (+16) and Kyrgyzstan (+8).

The biggest generational differences are found in the Middle East and North Africa. In Lebanon, for example, Muslims ages 35 and older are 28 percentage points more likely than younger Muslims to pray several times a day, 20 points more likely to attend mosque at least weekly and 18 points more likely to read the Quran daily. On each of these measures, age gaps of 10 points or more also are found in the Palestinian territories, Morocco and Tunisia. And somewhat smaller but statistically significant differences are observed as well in Jordan and Egypt.

Women and Men Similar, Except in Mosque Attendance 

Across the six regions included in the survey, women and men tend to be very similar in terms of the role religion plays in daily life. This holds true for the importance that both sexes place on religion, as well as for the frequency with which they observe daily rituals, such as prayer and reading (or listening to) the Quran. For example, among the countries surveyed in Central Asia, a median of 43% of Muslim women say religion is very important in their lives, compared with 42% of men. When it comes to prayer, medians of 31% of women and 28% of men in Central Asia pray several times a day. And nearly equal percentages of women (8%) and men (6%) across the region say they read or listen to the Quran daily.

The one exception to this pattern is mosque attendance: women are much more likely than men to say they never visit their local mosque. This gender gap is largest in South Asia and Central Asia. In South Asia, including Pakistan, a median of about three-quarters of women (77%) say they never attend mosque, compared with just 1% of men. In Central Asia, the comparable figures are 74% and 20%. Gender differences in mosque attendance are smaller, though still significant, in Southern and Eastern Europe (+27 percentage points) and the Middle East-North Africa region (+26 points). There is little or no gap, however, in Southeast Asia (+4) and sub-Saharan Africa (+1).

Sectarian Differences Vary in Importance 

The survey finds that sectarian identities, especially the distinction between Sunni and Shia Muslims, seem to be unfamiliar or unimportant to many Muslims. This is especially true across Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as in Central Asia, where medians of at least 50% describe themselves as “just a Muslim” rather than as a follower of any particular branch of Islam. Substantial minorities in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia also identify as “just a Muslim” (regional medians of 23% and 18%).

Sectarian identities appear to be particularly relevant in South Asia and the Middle East-North Africa region, where majorities identify as Sunnis or Shias. In the Middle East and North Africa, moreover, widespread identification with the Sunni sect is often coupled with mixed views about whether Shias are Muslims.

In five of seven countries surveyed in the Middle East and North Africa, at least four-in-ten or more Sunnis say Shias are not Muslims.⁶ Only in Iraq and Lebanon do overwhelming majorities of Sunnis accept Shias as members of the same faith. Indeed, Sunnis in these two countries are at least 23 to 28 percentage points more likely than Sunnis elsewhere in the region to recognize Shias as Muslims.⁷ 

This greater willingness of Sunnis in Iraq and Lebanon to accept Shias as fellow Muslims extends as well to attitudes about forms of worship traditionally associated with Shias. For example, while most Sunnis in the Middle East and North Africa view pilgrimages to the shrines of saints as falling outside Islamic tradition, majorities of Sunnis in Lebanon (98%) and Iraq (65%) believe this practice is acceptable in Islam. In this regard, Sunnis in these two countries resemble their fellow Shia countrymen more than they resemble Sunnis in neighboring countries such as Egypt and Jordan.

In Lebanon sectarian attitudes vary significantly by age. Lebanese Sunnis who are 35 and older are less willing than younger Sunnis to accept Shias as Muslims. The history of sectarian conflict in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s may help explain the generational difference. Sunnis who came of age during the conflict years are less inclined to view Shias as fellow Muslims. Yet, even with this generational difference, both younger and older Sunnis in Lebanon still are more willing than most Sunnis in the Middle East-North Africa region to say that Shias share the same faith.

Not just in the Middle East and North Africa but in other regions as well, the willingness of Sunnis to accept Shia as fellow Muslims tends to be higher in countries with sizable Shia populations. For example, in Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Russia – countries with self-identified Shia populations ranging from 6% to 37% – clear majorities of Sunnis (both men and women, young and old) agree that Shias belong to the Islamic faith. On the other hand, in Pakistan, where 6% of the survey respondents identify as Shia, Sunni attitudes are more mixed: 50% say Shias are Muslims, while 41% say they are not.

Sunnis and Shias  

Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims (also known as Shiites) comprise the two main branches of Islam. Sunni and Shia identities first formed soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 C.E., centering on a dispute over leadership succession. Over time, however, the political divide between the two groups broadened to include theological distinctions and differences in religious practices as well.

While the two groups are similar in many ways, they differ over conceptions of religious authority and interpretation as well as the role of the Prophet Muhammad’s descendants, among other issues.

Members of Sufi orders, which embrace mystical practices, can fall within either the Sunni or the Shia tradition. In some cases, Sufis may accept teachings from both traditions.

For additional information regarding Sunni and Shia Islam, see John Esposito, editor. 2003. “Shii Islam” and “Sunni Islam” in “The Oxford Dictionary of Islam.” Oxford: Oxford University Press, pages 290-93 and 304-307.

Views of Other Groups 

The survey also asked about attitudes toward Sufis and members of regionally specific groups or movements. Views of Sufis vary greatly by region. In South Asia, for example, a median of 77% consider Sufis to be Muslims; half in the Middle East and North Africa concur. However, significantly fewer Muslims in other regions surveyed accept Sufis as members of the Islamic faith. For example, in Southern and Eastern Europe (Russia and the Balkans), a median of 32% recognize Sufis as fellow Muslims, while in Southeast Asia and Central Asia the comparable figures are 24% and 18%.

Especially in Central Asia, the low percentage that accepts Sufis as Muslims may be linked to a lack of knowledge about this mystical branch of Islam: majorities in most Central Asian countries surveyed say either that they have never heard of Sufis or that they do not have an opinion about whether Sufis are Muslims.

Views of regionally or locally based groups and movements are mixed. For example, in South Asia and Southeast Asia, relatively few Muslims accept Ahmadiyyas as members of the Islamic faith. Only in Bangladesh do as many as four-in-ten recognize members of this movement as fellow Muslims; elsewhere in the two regions, a quarter or fewer agree. Even smaller percentages in Malaysia and Indonesia (9% and 5%, respectively) say that members of the mystical Aliran Kepercayaan movement are Muslims. (See Glossary for brief definitions of these groups.)

In Turkey, most Muslims (69%) acknowledge Alevis, who are part of the Shia tradition, as fellow Muslims. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, a modest majority (57%) say members of the Alawite sect are Muslims. By comparison, only about four-in-ten Lebanese Muslims (39%) say the same about the Druze.

About the Report 

These and other findings are discussed in more detail in the remainder of this report, which is divided into six main sections:

• Religious Affiliation 
• Religious Commitment 
• Articles of Faith 
• Other Beliefs and Practices 
• Boundaries of Religious Identity 
• Boundaries of Religious Practice 

This report also includes an appendix with comparable results from past Pew Research Center surveys of Muslims in the United States. There is also a glossary of key terms. The survey questionnaire and a topline with full results is also available. The report also includes an infographic. This report covers religious affiliation, beliefs and practices. A second report will cover Muslims’ attitudes and views on a variety of social and political questions.

The Pew Forum’s survey of the world’s Muslims includes every nation with a Muslim population of more than 10 million except Algeria, China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Together, the 39 countries and territories included in the survey are home to about two-thirds of all Muslims in the world.

The surveys that are the basis for this report were conducted across multiple years. Fifteen sub-Saharan countries with substantial Muslim populations were surveyed in 2008-2009 as part of a larger project that examined religion in that region. The methods employed in those countries – as well as some of the findings – are detailed in the Pew Forum report “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” An additional 24 countries and territories were surveyed in 2011-2012. In 21 of these countries, Muslims make up a majority of the population. In these cases, nationally representative samples of at least 1,000 respondents were fielded. The number of self-identified Muslims interviewed in these countries ranged from 551 in Lebanon to 1,918 in Bangladesh. In Russia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Muslims are a minority, oversamples were employed to ensure adequate representation of Muslims; in both cases, at least 1,000 Muslims were interviewed. Meanwhile, in Thailand, the survey was limited to the country’s five southern provinces, each with substantial Muslim populations; more than 1,000 interviews with Muslims were conducted across these provinces. Appendix C provides greater detail on the 2011-2012 survey’s methodology.

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Footnotes: 

2 According to Pew Forum estimates, 87-90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis, while 10-13% are Shias. For country-by-country estimates of the percentage of Sunnis and Shias, see the Pew Forum’s 2009 report “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” page 38. (return to text) 

3 For background on Sufi orders, see the Pew Forum’s 2010 report “Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe.” (return to text) 

4 Enumerations and translations of the articles of faith vary. Most are derived from the Hadith of Gabriel. See, for example, Sahih al-Bukhari 2:47 and Sahih al-Muslim 1:1. For details on hadith, see text box in Chapter 3. (return to text) 

5 In 2008-2009, the Pew Forum asked both Muslims and Christians in sub-Saharan Africa if the sacred texts of their respective religions are the word of God and should be taken literally. The results are reported in the 2010 report “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” (return to text) 

6 Questions about views of Muslim sects were not asked in sub-Saharan Africa. (return to text) 

7 All figures for Shia and Sunni subgroups within countries are based on self-identification in response to a multi-part survey question that first asked if an individual was Muslim (Q28 and Q28b), and if yes, if they were Sunni, Shia or “something else” (Q31). The percentage of Shias and Sunnis identified by the survey may diverge from country estimates reported in the Pew Forum’s 2009 report “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” which are based on demographic and ethnographic analyses, as well as reviews of frequently used estimates. (return to text) 

Photo Credit: © SZE FEI WONG / istockphoto

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Pre-Islamic Arabian History and Heritage

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Uncovering the hidden bodies in Saudi art

By Jane O'BrienBBC News, Washington17 November 2012 Last updated at 02:06 GMT

Saudi prince says an exhibition of pre-Islamic artefacts marks a cultural 'revolution' in the Kingdom's understanding of Arabia's past

A new exhibit in Washington shows off an unknown side of Saudi art, and promises to kick off a revolution of cultural and historical pride in the region.

For hundreds of years, popular perceptions of Arab culture have been dominated by Islam. But recent excavations in what is now modern-day Saudi Arabia are revealing evidence of sophisticated and ancient civilizations that are redefining the pre-Islamic era.

A lucrative trade in spices - particularly incense - created a network of caravan trails that stretched from the Horn of Africa to Iran and the Mediterranean. At its centre was the Arabian Peninsula, a cosmopolitan hub of commerce and culture.

"What we see is a Saudi Arabia that was not a closed peninsula. It was actually vitally connected to the rest of the ancient world," says Dr Julian Raby, director of the Sackler and Freer Galleries of Asian Art in Washington.

"And that's an incredibly important lesson because we have begun to imagine Saudi Arabia as always closed, always desert, isolated - almost as a backwater. This gives the lie to that."

'A revelation'

Colossal statues, bronze figurines, glassware, jewellery and mysterious stone steles are among the findings which span more than 6,000 years and are showcased in an exhibition at the Freer and Sackler - Roads of Arabia: Archaeology and History of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

This basalt tombstone is from Mecca, 9th Century

In particular, the exhibition demonstrates the importance of the human figure in art before the arrival of Islam in the 7th Century, when artistic expression became largely confined to calligraphy.

Among the highlights is a Hellenic bronze statue of Hercules from around 2CE and a group of muscular stone statues that would have lined the entrance to a temple between the 3rd and 4th Centuries BCE.

"None of this material has been seen in the US. For scholars, it's a revelation," says Dr Raby.

"For many people, what happens before Islam is of little or no relevance at all. But the 

Orientalist tradition in Europe and the States also condemned anything before Islam as being of no material cultural importance at all - because they didn't know what existed."

Part of that ignorance is due to the scarcity of written documents. The excavations that only started 40 years ago are providing the first tangible evidence of a culture before the 7th Century and the revelation of the Koran.

For hard-line Islamists some of the discoveries may prove controversial.

In 2001 the Taliban destroyed the Buddhas of Bamiyan, part of a 6th Century Unesco World Heritage site in Afghanistan. The extremists condemned the massive statues because they considered them to be idols.

Mada'in Saleh archaeological site, also known as al-Hijr, in Saudi Arabia is a Unesco world heritage site

Cultural kick-off

But the Saudi royal family has embraced the discoveries in the Arabian Peninsula and is vigorously promoting further research. And far from causing religious conflict, says Prince Sultan bin Salman, the ancient artefacts offer a new way of viewing Islam.

"Islam did not cancel the great civilisations of Arabia," he says.

"Islam came as a very proud religion, but it identified these ancient civilisations and did not demean them. We would be doing a disservice to Islam if we thought Islam came to a void, to a clean sheet of paper, to a people who had nothing else."

Prince Sultan is the president of the Saudi commission for tourism and antiquities. He hopes that interest in the past will encourage tourism in the future. He also wants Saudis themselves - especially young people - to better understand their heritage.

"This is a complete revolution in Saudi Arabia when it comes to elevating the culture and the history of the country to the level it deserves," he says.

"Within the next three years, Saudis will wake up to knowledge about their own country that has been missing throughout their lives."

The Saudi government wants more tourists to visit pre-Islamic sites like Mada'in Saleh

Several new museums are being planned with "big budgets" according to the prince, and international teams of archaeologists are working alongside Saudi scientists and historians. But Prince Sultan says his country wants to maintain control over its own heritage.

"We didn't want to hand over our country to teams from all over the world without us being in the middle of the finding and discovering of Saudi Arabia. But we are now ready. The time is right," he says.

Rewriting history

As well as changing perceptions of pre-Islamic culture, the excavations are offering evidence of how the environment and landscape have changed over millennia.

Today, Saudi Arabia is often dubbed the "Desert Kingdom". But early stone petroglyphs depict people on camels hunting ostriches - a bird that hasn't been able to survive in the region for thousands of years.

This is part of a horse figure, found at Al-Magar, dated 7,000 BC

Further scientific research is now needed to resolve a developing global controversy over the appearance of the first domesticated horse. Evidence so far points to its emergence in the Eurasian Steppe around 4,000BCE.

But some archaeologists say that a crudely carved stone slab portraying a horse's head and part of its torso found in southwest Saudi Arabia could date to 7,000BCE.

"If they're right, that would indicate the domestication of the horse, in Arabia, much earlier than anybody has ever thought," says Dr Raby.

"These objects indicate how much there is to be learned about Arabia's contribution to the history of mankind."

Experts predict many more important discoveries will emerge from Saudi Arabia in the next few years, an glut of information that could generate another major exhibition.

After centuries of being eclipsed by the bright light of Islam, the region's ancient past is starting to emerge from the shadows.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-20351085
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Taqlid and Following a Juristic School

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By Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi

Linguistic definition: Arabic linguists say that taqlid is derived from the root word qalada, which is a necklace that is fastened around the neck. From it comes the taqlid of a road; it is as though the follower fastens the ruling around the neck of the mujtahid, like a necklace.

Technical definition: taqlid is what Imam Ash-Shaukani describes in Sayl Al-Jarrar as acting upon another’s words without evidence.

It is important to note that this excludes acting upon the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him), acting upon ijma` (consensus), a layperson’s acting upon the fatwa of a mufti, and a judge’s consideration of the testimony of trustworthy witnesses – as their authority has already been established. The sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him) and ijma`, for those who recognize it, are both clear sources of authority. A layperson’s acting upon the statement of a mufti has been approved by ijma`. As for the statements of trustworthy witnesses weighing on a judge’s ruling, its credibility is derived from both the Qur’an and Sunnah – from the command to take testimony – as well as from ijma`.

Also excluded are the narrations of hadith narrators, as their processes of authentication and legitimacy are already in place. Furthermore, these are not merely the statements of the narrator, but the one narrated about, which is the Prophet Muhammad (Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him).

In deed, a better definition is found in Ibn Al-Humam‘s Tahrir (died 861 A.H): “Taqlid is acting upon the words of someone not recognized as a source of authority, without evidence.” Al-Qaffal (died 365 A.H) suggested, “It is accepting the statement (legal opinion) of someone while not knowing where he got it from.” Sheikh Abu Hamid Al-Asfarayini (died 406 A.H) and Sheikh Abu Mansur `Abdul-Qahir Al-Baghdadi (died 429 A.H) both stated, “It is the acceptance of a legal opinion from one whose authority is not established, without evidence.”

The Ruling on Taqlid in Following  Madhhab (Islamic juristic school)

There are three opinions on the issue of taqlid:

1. Requiring taqlid in following a madhhab
2. Prohibiting taqlid and requiring ijtihad
3. Permitting taqlid for one who has not reached the level of ijtihad

Opinion #1: The Requirement of Taqlid in Following a Madhhab

The first opinion makes a requirement on everyone, whether they are lay-people or accomplished scholars. It prohibits modern scholars from practicing any form or level of ijtihad. Rather, ijtihad is considered banned in theory and obsolete in practice, its doors having been closed in the third or fourth centuries, or even earlier than that.

This opinion essentially makes the taqlid of one of the four madhhabs a religious requirement on every Muslim. Those who hold this view do not even permit modern scholars to prefer an opinion outside of their followed madhhab. Departing from one of the four popularly known madhhabs to follow other madhhabs or opinions (even if they are from the Sahaba or Tabi’in) is absolutely unacceptable.

Therefore, if those who hold this view reject choosing or preferring existing sayings and opinions over others, then they are even stronger in their rejection of independent ijtihad – even if it is only partial ijtihad on some issues. They reject it, regardless of the changing circumstances that life creates, and the ideas and ideologies that people are exposed to. All of this is built upon their conviction that the door of ijtihad is to be blocked.

Some later scholars spoke about the requirement of following one of the four madhhabs. Sheikh As-Sawy Al-Maliki (died 1241 Hijri) who authored the famous “hashiyah” on Imam al-Dardir’s  Ash-Sharh As-Saghir about jurisprudence, and another “hashiyah” on tafseer Al-Jalalayn, said:

“Taqlid is not allowed except in (following) one of the four madhhabs, even if it agrees with a statement of the Sahaba (companions), an authentic hadith, and/or an ayah of the Qur’an, as one who is outside of the four madhhabs is misguided and misguiding others. Perhaps it would lead one to disbelief, as taking from what is apparent in the Qur’an and Sunnah is from the foundations of disbelief.”

Look at the stringency of this sheikh, who lived at the same time as Ash-Shaukani, and contemplate the disparity between their views. He banned taqlid except within one the four madhhabs, even if an opinion agreed with a statement of the Sahaba; even worse, if it agreed with the text of an authentic Prophetic hadith; and worse still, even if it agreed with an ayah of the Holy Qur’an!

Another exaggeration is to consider one who is outside the four madhhabs (even if only in a specific case) as “misguided and misguiding others,” and that this may potentially lead to disbelief! All of this is rash and does not follow what the investigative scholars have agreed upon.

The opinion that taqlid was required was adopted by religious schools and universities in later centuries. The salaf (first generation) from the scholars of these universities passed it down to the khalaf, who began to instill in their students, “One who makes taqlid of an `alim meets Allah salim (securely)!”

I remember learning this in Azhar’s religious high school in a class on the science of Tawhid. In my required reading from the Jawharah of Al-Qarni and its explanation by Al-Bājuri, the author states:

“…And Malik and the rest of the Imams / Like Abul-Qasim, guiders of the Ummah, (said) taqlid is required of the learned man – one of them, / As the people relate in terms (they) understand.”

Abul-Qasim here refers to the great sufi, Al-Junaid ibn Muhammad (died 297 Hijri), may Allah have mercy on him. It implies that it is incumbent upon every Muslim to follow an imam from the imams of the four Islamic juristic schools.

Imam Malik is specifically mentioned because the author is Maliki. He suggests that an imam of jurisprudence is to be followed in the same manner that sufi imams are followed on issues of tarbiyah (self-development). Such was the legacy of Junaid with the scholars – the integrity of his tariqah (method), the soundness of his direction, and his remoteness from extremism and innovation.

Some scholars also mandated the following of a well-known imam in `aqeedah (creed), such as Abul-Hasan Al-Ashʿari (died 334 Hijri) or Abul-Mansur Al-Maturidi.

The most prevalent tradition amongst our knowledgeable brethren in the Maghrib (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania) and the graduates of Zaytuna, Qayrawiyyin, and other institutes is to follow the Ashʿari madhhab in creed, the Maliki madhhab in jurisprudence, and the madhab or Sufi Path of Junaid in conduct ( May Allah be pleased with them all).

To summarize, the integrals and potential pitfalls of this opinion include:

1. Requiring taqlid on all people, even the people of knowledge.
2. Requiring taqlid of only the Imams of the four madhhabs, and prohibiting the adoption of any legal ruling outside of these madhhabs.
3. Requiring taqlid of only ONE of these four imams. Thus, not allowing mobility from one of these four madhhabsmadhhab’s position is apparent. to another one of these four, even if only in a few matters where the weakness of the
4. Calling for blocking the door of ijtihad, and standing up against any call for ijtihad, even if only partial.
5. Viewing one’s own madhhab as better than the others, and succumbing to an ethnocentric mind frame.

Many scholars have responded to this outlook on Taqlid, including ibn Abdul-Barr, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Al-Qayyim, As-San’ani, Ash-Shaukani, Al-Dahlawi, and others.

Opinion#2: The Prohibition of Taqlid and the Requirement of Ijtihad

The second opinion is the exact opposite of the first: prohibiting taqlid and requiring ijtihad for all people. Those who hold this position obligate every Muslim to take their legal rulings directly from the Qur’an and Sunnah. They fiercely reject the following of the four madhhabs, and even attack those that propagate that view vehemently. Perhaps some of them are excessive in their attack of taqlid since they bash the madhhabs themselves, and some even extend their slander to the founders of the madhhabs as well.

Historically, the most powerful proponent of this view, from what we know, was the famous Thahiri jurist, Abu Muhammad ibn Hazm. He authored many books, including Al-Ihkam fi Usul Al-Ahkam on the foundational principles of jurisprudence, Al-Muhalla on comparative jurisprudence, and Al-Fasl fi`l-Milal wa n-Nihal on the history of religions and sects, and others.

A great scholar from later times, Imam Ash-Shaukani, helped promote this understanding in many of his books, including Irshad Al-Fuhul, As-Sayl Al-Jarar, and in his risalah, Al-Qawl Al-Mufid fi`l-Ijtihad wat-Taqlid. He emphatically rejected Taqlid, although less fiercely than Ibn Hazm.

In our times, a group from the people of hadith champion this perspective, with Sheikh Muhammad Nasiruddin Al-Albani and his followers at the forefront.

The adversaries of those who follow this viewpoint have named them “Al-La Madhhabbiyin” or those with no madhhab, because they reject adopting any madhhab – neither for the scholar nor for the layman Muslim. These adversaries have responded with a plethora of articles and books. Examples include the great Turkish scholar Sheikh Muhammad Zahid Al-Kawthari’s article, “Al-La Madhhabiyyah Qentara illa al-La Diniyyah,” and those by the great Hamawi scholar, Sheikh Muhammad Al-Hamid, as well as Dr. Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan Al-Buti’s book, Al-La Madhhabiyyah Akhtar Bid`ah Tahaddat Ash-Shari`ah Al-Islamiyyah.

Once again, we can summarize the integrals and pitfalls of this other extreme to include:

1. The prohibition of taqlid on everyone, even the laypeople who do not have access to the tools of ijtihad.
2. The plethora of claims by young people (who have become superficial and rough) that they have reached the level of Mujtahideen.
3. The audacity of young people to dismiss great scholars and Mujtahideen from previous eras.
4. The disdain for the Ummah’s juristic schools, despite the immense amount of beneficial knowledge they contain.
5. The transgression of some followers in bashing the madhhabs and their Imams.
6. The growth of the tendency towards literalism amongst them, to the point that some have named them “The Neo-Thahiriyyah.”
7. The occupation of the Ummah in arguments over minor disagreements in jurisprudence, which has led to much infighting.
8. The denunciation of those opposed to their calls, suggesting that they alone are properly following the Qur’an and Sunnah.

Imam Ash-Shaukani and Taqlid

Imam Muhammad ibn Ali Al-Shaukani (died 1250 Hijri) was a towering leader of revival and ijtihad in the thirteenth century Hijri, as is apparent from his books on ijtihad. For instance, in his As-Sayl Al-Jarrar, which explains the text of Al-Azhar (a foundational text on the Zaydi or Haduwi jurisprudence), he treads a path of independent ijtihad; he uses the Qur’an and Sunnah, and expresses his own legal opinions, which lie outside the four or eight madhhabs of his time. Another example is his famous Nayl Al-Awtar, where he explains the book Muntaqa`l-Akhbar min Ahadith Sayyid Al-Akhbar by Ibn Taymiyyah. This book has become a significant resource on modern jurisprudence for both Sunni and non-Sunni schools. Another example is his book, Al-Darari al-Muḍiyyah, (an explanation of Al-Durar al-Bahiyyah) in which he summarized the independence of his jurisprudence.

In fact, Imam al-Shaukani intensely opposed taqlid and called for ijtihad in more than one of his books:

His famous book on the foundational principles of jurisprudence, Irshad al-Fuhul.
His risalah, Al-Qawl al-Mufid fiAdillati`l-ijtihad wa`l-Taqlid.
His book Adab al-Talib wa Muntaha`l-Arab.
His extensive work, al-Sayl al-Jarrar.
Al-Shaukani also offers alternate interpretations for what proponents of taqlid use as the basis of their arguments (i.e. ayahs from the Qur’an, such as: “So ask the people of knowledge if you do not know” (An-Nahl 16: 43), and statements of the Messenger (Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him) such as, “Do they not ask if they do not know? The cure for confusion is to inquire”. Al-Shaukani clarifies that these do not entail taqlid of a specific person in every issue, but rather asking whoever is accessible from the people of knowledge, as was the practice at the time of the Prophet (Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him) and his companions.

Al-Shaukani benefits from the writings of Ibn al-Qayyim – which rejected taqlid- and also those of Imam Ibn Abdul-Barr, Ibn Hazm, and others before him. He also rejects the notion that the door of ijtihad was closed, considering it to be a blameworthy innovation. He explains that the blessing of Allah is vast, and cannot be limited to a specific era, or monopolized by a specific group of people. Rather, it is open to all those whom Allah has gifted with the capability.

Al-Shaukani called for ijtihad and practiced absolute and independent ijtihad. He did not adhere to any of the known madhhabs, neither in foundational principles of jurisprudence nor in the actual jurisprudence – even though he had originally started out as a Zaydi. He even developed his own foundational principles, which he explains in his Irshad al-Fuhul ila Tahqiq al-Haq min ‘Ilm al-Usul.

He did, however, oppose the use of independent legal reasoning and opinion (ra’y) in jurisprudence, and also rejected the legal school of ra’y in its entirety. Instead, he insisted on a complete dependence on revelation, stating that the religion is not formulated by the opinions of imams, but rather by the narrations of the Seal of the religion, the Messenger of Allah (Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him). He believed that a layperson who is not qualified to perform ijtihad ought to ask scholars to qualify their positions from the Qur’an and Sunnah, and not base it on their opinions.

I agree with Shaukani in some aspects and disagree with him on others. I am with him in:

. His call to the scholars for independent ijtihad.
. His rejection of those who impose taqlid on everyone in the Ummah.
. His opposition of those who require that one be limited to a single madhhab on every issue.
. His rejection of those who strictly follow a specific madhhab, even on issues where the weakness of their madhhab’s sources is made clear to them.
. His rejection of the idea that the doors of ijtihad were closed after the second or third century after Hijri.
. His encouragement of the Ummah to follow the Qur’an and Sunnah, over the opinion of men.

However, I take issue with his prohibition of taqlid on the masses and his prohibition of following a madhhab. I do not see anything that prevents people from following an Imam and adhering to his madhhab, like the madhhab of Abu Hanifa, Malik, al-Shafi`i, Ahmad, Zayd, al-Hadi, Ja`far, Jabir and others. This is allowed but not required, according to the Shari`ah. The preferred position is that a lay-person does not keep a madhhab. Rather, his madhhab is the madhhab of the one he asks from among the scholars. As such, he is allowed to go from his madhhab to another, and he may ask whomever he wants from the scholars on whatever issues concern him. He may even leave his madhhab,madhhab has stronger proofs. in some cases, and follow another if he believes that the other

I also differ with Imam al-Shaukani in his opposition to the use of independent legal reasoning and opinion (ra’y) in jurisprudence as being something that is against the Shari`ah. The truth is that there is no jurisprudence without ra’y. Blameworthy ra’y is that which goes against clear texts. However, ra’y on topics where there is no textual basis, and ra’y used to better understand the texts according to their foundational principles and in light of the greater objectives of Shari`ah, is indispensable. There must be ra’y in areas that can be overlooked due to specific legal flexibilities, or in areas that lack definitive texts that clearly require adherence. This occurs through:

. Qiyas (a process of analogical reasoning) using scriptural texts, or
. Istihsan (a process of legal preference) to side-step clear but weak qiyas for stronger but more hidden qiyas, or
. Istislah (seeking the greater benefit) to act on public interest, with its legal conditions, or
. ‘Urf (custom) in its allotted space, or
. Sadd al-Thara’iʿ (blocking the means to evil) or
. Istishab (presumption of continuity), etc.

All of these involve the use of ra’y. Can the jurist really be above using it? For that matter, is the jurisprudence of the likes of `Umar, `Uthman, `Ali, Ibn Mas`ud, Zaid, Ibn `Abbas, and others, free from it?

Is it even possible to understand the texts correctly without ra’y? Did not the companions of the Prophet (Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him) use their ra’y when they prayed `Asr on their way to Bani Quraytha? They were more right than those who delayed their prayer until they arrived at their destination, but after the time of prayer had passed, as suggested by Ibn Ibn Taymiyah.

Are the greater objectives of the Shari`ah not an example of the use of ra’y in understanding Qur’anic and Prophetic texts?

Is not `Umar’s moratorium on the punishment for stealing during the famine an example of ra’y? Is not his decision to transfer the liability of blood money from the tribe to the state an example of ra’y? Is not his decision against the distribution of specific conquered lands of Iraq to the Muslim army an example of ra’y? Is not his prohibition on marrying ‘women of the book’ for fear of its impact on Muslim women, an example of ra’y? Is not his decision to combine full brothers with half-brothers (from the mother’s side) in inheritance law – even after having ruled otherwise – an example of ra’y?(1)

Is not `Uthman’s position that divorce is not binding if uttered while the husband is experiencing a near-death illness an example of ra’y?(2) Is it not related that Abu Bakr and other companions said, “I give legal edicts with my ra’y, for if it is correct it is from of Allah, and if it is wrong, then Allah, the Glorified is free of any blame”?

Did the Noble Messenger (Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him) not accept Mu`adh’s response when he sent him to Yemen? When he (Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him) asked, “By what will you judge?”, Mu`adh responded that he would judge by the Book of Allah, then by the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah. If the answer was not to be found in the Book or the Sunnah, he said, “I will make ijtihad by my ra’y.”

Did the companions not differ on some rulings because of the differences in their ra’y and understanding?

Opinion #3: The Allowance of Taqlid for One Who Has Not Reached the Level of Ijtihad

The third opinion does not impose taqlid on its adherents, as with the first opinion, nor does it prohibit it, as with the second opinion. Instead, it allows taqlid for some and prohibits it on others. Imam Hasan al-Banna discusses this in one of his “20 Principles of Understanding”:

“Every Muslim who has not reached the level of understanding the arguments of legal deduction and jurisprudence is encouraged to follow the works of the great Imams of Islamic jurisprudence. While following an Imam, one should try to understand the argument of the Imam. Once the credibility of the Imam is established, one should accept any of this Imam’s guidance, equipped with proper arguments. With that, a Muslim is advised to exert the necessary efforts to acquire such a level of understanding for arguments of legal deduction and jurisprudence.”

Thus, he did not make taqlid or following a madhhab mandatory, and he did not make it prohibited. Rather, he allowed it, but not for everyone. It is legally sanctioned for “every Muslim who has not reached the level of understanding the arguments of legal deduction” – that is – for the lay person and the like who are not qualified to derive rulings from the Qur’an and Sunnah, or to know ijma`, qiyas, and the other methodologies which build upon these foundational ones, such as istislah, `urf, istishab, and the Shari`ah of those before us.

Following vs. Blindly Imitating

In his wisdom, Hassan al-Banna prefers the word ittiba` (to follow) over taqlid (to blindly imitate) in his principle, stating Muslims are ‘to follow (yattabi`u) one of the great imams of Islamic jurisprudence. The Qur’an too, uses the word ittiba` in contexts that make it praiseworthy and legally acceptable.

This is seen in the statement of Ibrahim: “{Oh my father, indeed there has come to me of the knowledge what has not come to you, so follow me; I will guide you to an even path }” (Maryam 19: 43). This ayah invites one to follow the ones who are knowledgeable in areas that one does not know.

We also see in the story of Musa (as) and the famous righteous servant of Allah, Khidr: “{Then they found one of Our servants whom We blessed with mercy, and taught from Our knowledge. Moses said to him, “Can I follow you that you may teach me some of the knowledge and guidance bestowed upon you? }” (Al-Kahf 18: 65-66).

Musa (as) asks to be permitted to follow Khidhr (“ittiba`ih”) so he may learn from the knowledge that Allah, the Exalted, had given him. This shows that following the knowledgeable, in certain cases, is not blameworthy.

Imam Abu ‘Umar ibn Abdul-Barr said: “The purpose of knowledge is clarity – to grasp the known as it truly is. For when something is made clear to someone, he has come to know it. The scholars say that the one who makes taqlid has no knowledge, and they do not differ in that.”

Abu Abdullah bin Khuwayz Mindad al-Basri al-Maliki said, “The meaning of taqlid is to turn to a statement that is not substantiated with proofs.  Ittiba` implies that the statement is grounded in legal justification.  Ittiba` is sanctioned in the religion, while taqlid is not.”

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Notes:

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: While this is just an English rendering of some issues regarding the subject of taqlid and tamadhhub, it is in no way an exhaustive or complete discussion of the subject. For more information on this topic, please refer to Sheikh Qaradawi’s work, Kayfa Nata`mal Ma`a’l-Turath (How Do We Deal with the Tradition) in which these pages represent only a small section.

1. This is referring to a specific situation of Islamic Inheritance Law (al-mas’alah al-himariyyah).

2. This is referred to as Talaq al-Farr (Divorce of Escape), for one is trying to escape the possibility of having his wife inherit from him.

This is referring to a specific situation of Islamic Inheritance Law (al-mas alah al-himariyyah)
Taken, with slight editorial modifications, from: www.suhaibwebb.com This article is translated from Sh. Qaradawi’s work, Kayfa Nata`mal Ma`a’l-Turath wa`l-Tamadhhub wa`l-Ikhtilāf (pgs. 62-73).

This article is translated by Muslema Purmul.

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