Thursday, July 19, 2012

Revolution: Being Calm and Objective in Confusing Times


Sheikh Salman al-Oadah
Fri, 04/20/2012

Calm is a necessity. It allows us to take a balanced look at two relevant topics: one being the need to obey the law, and the other being that of civil disobedience and revolution. We cannot summarily dismiss either one of these concepts as false and then categorically embrace the other as being both noble and eternally good.

We must avoid the tendency for letting our enquiry to become a means for justifying certain events taking place in the world today, as if what is going on is a perfect example of some political principle or another. Another danger we must take care to avoid, especially when discussing Islamic principles, is that of selectivity in what we choose to notice in the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the Muslim scholars, ignoring what does not support our arguments. This has always been a danger whenever Muslims have discussed political questions.

Consider the following two examples:

The Claim that Only a Person of Quraishi Descent Can Be Caliph

When we consult the references to political leadership in some classical commentaries on the Prophetic hadith, like al-Nawawī’s commentary on Sahīh Muslim or al-`Asqalānī’s Fath al-Barī, you will find discussions like the following:
`Iyād said: “For the Caliph to be of Qurayshi descent is a condition recognised by all Islamic scholars. It is deemed a point of scholarly consensus, and nothing has been related to the contrary from any of the Pious Predecessors.” He also said: “There is no need to take the opinions of the Kharijites into account, not those of the Mu`tazilites who agreed with them, since their opinions constitute a divergence from Muslim opinion.” [Fath al-Bārī (13/119)]
Al-Nawawī, in particular, writes:
The office of Caliph is reserved for those of Qurayshi descent. It is impermissible to appoint anyone else to this office. This was the established consensus of the Muslims ever since the era of the Companions. Those who have expressed their disagreement on this point, whether from the heretical innovators or from those who have been influence by them, their disagreement is disregarded as being contrary to the consensus of the Companions and Successors. [Sharh Sahīh Muslim (12/200)]
Similar statements were made by al-Qurtubī in his commentary on , entitled al Mufhim (4/5-6).

The consensus that is being claimed here is not above question. For one thing, the eminent Companion of the Prophet and the second Caliph of Islam, `Umar b. Al-Khattāb, said: “If Abū Hudhayfah’s freed slave Sālim were alive, I would have appointed him as my successor.” [Tārīkh al-Tabarī (4/227)]

Ibn Hajar comments on another statement of `Umar’s in Fath al-Bārī, saying:
Those who claim there is consensus on the issue of the Caliph being from Quraysh must find a way to interpret what `Umar said: “If my time of death arrives and Abū `Ubaydah is still alive, I will appoint him as my successor. If at the time of my death Abū `Ubaydah is no longer alive, I will appoint Mu`ādh b. Jabal as my successor.” This statement has been substantiated by Ahmad with a chain of transmission containing narrators who are all reliable.

Now, Mu`ādh b.Jabal is from Madinah and has no kinship with the tribe of Quraysh whatsoever. It might be argued that the Companions arrived at their consensus opinion that the Caliph must be of Qurayshi descent after `Umar’s time, or that `Umar later on changed his mind. And Allah knows best. [Fath al-Bārī (13/119)]
On the day of the Prophet’s death, the Companions gathered at the common building (saqīfah) of the tribe of Banū Sā`idah to discuss the future leadership of the Muslim community. If we consider what some of the Companions who were natives of Madinah said at that gathering, we can see that they held another view.

As for the condition that the Caliph must be from Quraysh, it is likely to be a recommendation based on the historical contingencies of that time. It was not possible to get all the tribes of Arabia in that era to give their allegiance to anyone but a member of the Quraysh tribe. There are, no doubt, more critical qualities that the Caliph needs to have, like to be just and of upright character, and to govern on the basis of consultation with the citizenry.

As for the statements we quoted from al-Qādī `Iyād, al-Nawawī, and others, they have become obscure today. We scarcely hear these opinions being mentioned in articles, lectures, or sermons. Had the subject matter been that of obedience to the rulers, we would not have seen such claims of consensus made by such eminent scholars being neglected in this way, especially when they describe those who disagree with them as being “heretical innovators” like the Kharijites and Mu`tazilites whose views constitute “a divergence from Muslim opinion”.

This is precisely what has happened, as we can see in the next example:

Obedience to Rulers

Al-Nawawī, whom we quoted above, says just a few pages later on in the same work of commentary:
As for those who revolt against the rulers or fight against them, this is forbidden according to the consensus of the Muslims., even if those rulers are iniquitous tyrants. There are clear prophetic hadith to support what we say, and the followers of the Sunnah are of a consensus that the ruler is not deposed on account of iniquity. [Sharh Sahīh Muslim (12/229)]
We hear this statement and others like it being repeated with great emphasis in many articles and sermons today. However, it is true that many of the Pious Predecessors and a number of later scholars and commentators held another view, arguing that it is permissible to revolt against a tyrannical and iniquitous ruler. We find such opinions being expressed by the likes of Ibn Hazm, al-Ghazālī, and al-ĪJī. [refer to: Ibn Hazm’s al-Fasl bayna al-Milal wa al-Nihal (4/84) and al-Ījī’s al-Mawāqif (8/2)]

When we compare the claim of consensus being made in this instance with the similar claim about the Caliph being from the tribe of Quraysh, we find that those who so strongly support the second claim regarding obedience to leaders usually refrain from mentioning the other claim at all, or we find them expressing the opposite view.

Neutrality in such matters cannot be achieved by those who only mention evidence and arguments to promote a particular point of view, in disregard of any objective standards. This is not to be understood as an indictment of the people who support those in power. Those who see revolution as a universal truth or civil disobedience as the way to approach all matters are just as guilty of bias. Their own conduct, more often than not, leads to just another form of individual or collective tyranny.

Many of those who support revolutions are really seeking after a particular model of government that they wish to impose, which often brings social fragmentation and fosters the growth of enmity, bigotry, fear, and disillusionment, as well as the loss of civil liberty – conditions which make society ripe for a counter-revolution. In all cases, we find people are prone to a selective vision that is not conducive to knowledge or piety.

If we are to arrive at a mature, Islamic vision with respect to political issues – like the relationship between the government and the governed, the question of revolution and civil disobedience, and the development of democratic institutions – we need to be calm, psychologically and intellectually. We also need to be impartial and keep ourselves above vested interests, tribalism, and factional interests. At the same time, we must be careful not to make universal pronouncements based on local conditions and apply them to disparate societies and situations.

Confusion of the Intellectuals and Legal Scholars

After the Second World War, Francois Faure wrote an article entitled “Confusion of the Intelligentsia after World War II”. After the Algerian War of Independence against France, Malek Bennabi followed suit with an article entitled “Confusion of the Algerian Intelligentsia after the Revolution”. Now, in the wake of the Arab Spring, it appears that a situation has developed which we could describe as the “Confusion of the Intelligentsia after the Arab Spring”

There is confusion as to how to get beyond the present situation. There is confusion as to how to rebuild a conceptual framework for society. There is even confusion as to how to understand the revolutions that have so recently taken place. Finally, it is unclear how the country is to rebuild its relationships, determine its allies, and identify who its friends and enemies are.

At times of confusion, each faction believes that its solutions are the right one and everyone adheres doggedly to the solutions they have come up with. However, these solutions are always plagued by fear and uncertainty.

At this time, in the rapidly changing Arab world, there is a desperate need for Muslim scholars who possess clear insight and have a strong understanding of contemporary society, as well as good moral character. It is, in turn, the duty of governments, civil societies, and institutions to hasten in shaping clear policies to ensure the just distribution of political power.